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Abstract
This Note addresses U.S. obligations under CERD in the context of racial disparity in the
imposition of the death penalty and proposes courses of domestic and international action. Part I
examines the historical racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in the United States.
It discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McClesky to deny relief to a death row inmate
who demonstrated that race influenced whether a death sentence was imposed. Part I also explores
the development of CERD and discusses CERD’s standard for proving discrimination based on a
showing of racially discriminatory effect. Finally, Part I addresses the U.S. ratification of CERD
and its reservations to the treaty. Part II explores commentators’ varying positions on CERD’s ap-
plicability in the United States in light of the declaration making CERD a non-self-executing treaty.
Part II also addresses the divergence of U.S. standards for proving discrimination, which generally
require a showing of discriminatory purpose, from those under CERD, which recognize claims
based on a showing of discriminatory effect. Part III argues that despite the non-self-executing
declaration, death row inmates who demonstrate that the death penalty disproportionately affects
their racial group may invoke CERD as a defense. This part also asserts that because U.S. stan-
dards for proving discrimination in the criminal justice context diverge from the standards set forth
under CERD, U.S. courts should address the merits of claims invoking CERD as a defense. Fi-
nally, Part III encourages State Parties besides the United States to use the treaty’s enforcement
mechanisms to challenge the United States’ the non-self- executing declaration as being incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty and to protest its failure to address racial disparity
in the imposition of the death penalty as a violation of CERD. This Note concludes that CERD has
the potential to be a powerful tool to address racial disparity in death penalty cases in the United
States.
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INTRODUCTION
Warren McClesky, an African-American man, was convicted
of murdering a white police officer1 and sentenced to death in
the Superior Court of Fulton County in Georgia in 1978.2 After
making several appeals to the Supreme Court of Georgia,' Mc-
Clesky filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in the
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1. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987). The murder occurred in the
course of a robbery of a furniture store, which McClesky and three accomplices
planned and carried out. Id. The store manager was forced at gunpoint to turn over
the store receipts, his watch, and US$6. Id. During the robbery, a police officer, an-
swering a silent alarm, entered the store through the front door and was shot and
killed. Id. McClesky admitted to participating in the robbery, but denied shooting the
officer. Id. The state presented substantial evidence linking McClesky to the shooting.
Id. The jury convicted McClesky of two counts of armed robbery and one count of
murder and recommended the death penalty. Id. at 284. The trial court complied and
sentenced McClesky to death. Id.
2. Id. at 282-83. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether McClesky's
evidence that racial factors enter into death sentencing in Georgia proved that Mc-
Clesky's death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. McClesky presented a complex statistical study indicating that black
defendants convicted of killing white victims were more likely to receive the death pen-
alty in Georgia than any other racial combination. Id. at 287. The Court upheld his
death sentence, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate a constitutional viola-
tion. Id. at 319-20.
3. Id. at 284. McClesky appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme
Court of Georgia, which affirmed on both counts. McClesky v. State, 263 S.E.2d 146
(Ga. 1980). He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but it denied certiorari. Mc-
Clesky v. Georgia, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). The trial court denied his motion for a new
trial and his writ of habeas corpus, which was also denied by another Georgia trial court.
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 285-86. McClesky appealed a second time to the Supreme Court
of Georgia, which denied his petition, and then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which again denied certiorari. Id. at 286.
2270
RETHINKING McCLESKY v. KEMP 2271
Northern District of Georgia.4 His petition challenged the death
sentence on the grounds that it was imposed in a racially dis-
criminatory manner that violated his Eighth Amendment' right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Four-
teenth Amendment6 right to equal protection under the laws.7
In support of his claim, McClesky presented a statistical study
demonstrating that race influenced whether the death penalty
was imposed in Georgia.' In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court in
McClesky v. Kemp upheld the death sentence.9 While the Court
presumed the validity of the statistical study, 10 it held that the
study did not establish a constitutional violation because it did
not demonstrate that the decisionmakers in McClesky's case pur-
posely discriminated against him.11
In 1994, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent 12 to the
Clinton Administration to ratify the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
("CERD" or "Convention"). 3 CERD prohibits racial discrimina-
tion, which it defines as any distinction based on race that has
the purpose or effect of impairing human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. 14 CERD requires nations that have ratified CERD
4. Id. McClesky's petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court for the
Northern District of Georgia raised eighteen claims, including one that the Georgia
death sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner, which
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall
not be inflicted).
" 6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
7. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 279, 283 (1987).
8. See id. (noting that McClesky submitted statistical study conducted by Profs.
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth ("Baldus Study"), which
demonstrated disparity in imposition of death penalty based on race of victim and race
of defendant).
9. See id. at 320 (affirming judgment of Court of Appeals for Eleventh Circuit).
10. See id. at 292 n.7 (explaining that U.S. Supreme Court assumed that Baldus
Study was statistically valid and did not review factual findings of district court).
11. See id. at 293 (rejecting McClesky's argument that Baldus Study compelled in-
ference of purposeful discrimination).
12. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that two-thirds of U.S. Senate must give
"advice and consent" to President in, order to ratify treaties).
13. See 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter CERD Ratifica-
tion] (consenting to ratification of CERD).
14. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216 [hereinaf-
ter CERD]. Article 1(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD" or "Convention") states:
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("State Parties") to review, amend, or nullify laws and practices
that have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
race. 5 The United States ratified CERD with three reservations,
an understanding, and a declaration that qualified the extent to
which the United States would adhere to the treaty.' 6
The declaration stated that the United States did not ratify
CERD as a self-executing treaty. 7 By declaring CERD to be non-
self-executing, the United States asserted that CERD did not cre-
ate an independent cause of action in U.S. courts.'" The United
States claimed that because its laws provided extensive protec-
tions and remedies against racial discrimination, it did not need
to enact additional legislation to comply with CERD.' 9
Critics argue that by ratifying CERD as non-self-executing,
the United States prevents U.S. citizens from invoking rights
under the treaty, thereby nullifying the treaty's effect in the
United States.2 ° Other critics contend that CERD could provide
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or im-
pairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life.
Id.
15. See id. art. 2(1)(c), at 218 (stating that "[e]ach State Party shall take effective
measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or
nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial
discrimination wherever it exists").
16. CERD Ratification, supra note 13, at S7634.
17. Id.; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (explaining that "self-executing" treaty requires no domestic legislation to give it
force of law in United States); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th
Cir. 1991) (finding that "a treaty must be self-executing in order for an individual citi-
zen to have standing to protest a violation of the treaty").
18. Hearing on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 13 (1994) [herein-
after Foreign Relations Committee Hearing] (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advi-
sor, U.S. Dep't of State).
19. See id. (noting that existing federal, state, and local regulations provide com-
prehensive opportunities for challenges to discriminatory statutes and other govern-
ment action).
20. See id. at 51 (prepared statement of Wade Henderson, Dir., Washington Bu-
reau, National Ass'n. for the Advancement of Colored Persons ("NAACP")) (claiming
that non-self-executing declaration will deny U.S. citizens protection of international
human rights law); id. at 52 (statement of William T. Lake, Member, Board of Dirs.,
International Human Rights Law Group ("IHRLG")) (asserting that non-self-executing
declaration will prevent U.S. citizens from enforcing treaty rights in U.S. courts).
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additional remedies for U.S. citizens whose claims of racial dis-
crimination are not redressed in U.S. courts. 21 These commen-
tators argue that although U.S. law generally requires a com-
plainant to demonstrate discriminatory purpose in order to gain
relief under the Equal Protection Clause,2 2 CERD recognizes
proof of discrimination by showing discriminatory effect alone.23
Most commentators maintain that by precluding private
causes of action, the non-self-executing declaration effectively
prevents U.S. courts from addressing the substantive provisions
of CERD. 24 Some scholars have argued, however, that a non-self-
executing treaty does not preclude a claim based on treaty rights
as long as the claim invokes a cause of action under U.S. law,
rather than relying on the treaty itself as a cause of action.25 A
21. See Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System,
40 How. L.J. 641, 670 (1997) (noting that issues of discrimination in U.S. criminal
justice context may violate CERD provisions that prohibit laws and practices with dis-
criminatory effect); Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, The Prison Industrial Complex: A Modern
Justfication for African Enslavement, 41 How. L.J. 349, 373 (1998) (stating that CERD's
protections against discriminatory effect may avoid current obstacles under U.S. equal
protection analysis).
22. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270-71 (1977) (rejecting claim under Equal Protection Clause after finding that
local housing authority did not purposefully discriminate in zoning decision); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (holding that disproportionate racial impact of
tests for police departments applicants did not demonstrate purposeful discrimination
against blacks); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) (finding that petitioner has
burden to prove existence of purposeful discrimination).
23. See Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 288 (1985)
(noting that where discriminatory purpose cannot be shown to be within CERD's scope,
it may be inferred by demonstrating discriminatory effect); Taifa, supra note 21, at 659
(stating that CERD condemns laws and practices with discriminatory effect regardless of
purpose).
24. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 62 (prepared statement
of American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")) (stating that non-self-executing declara-
tion deprives U.S. courts of opportunity to use CERD provisions to expand individual
rights); id. at 65 (prepared statement of Amnesty International USA) (asserting that
non-self-executing declaration denies U.S. citizens of opportunities under CERD to
challenge discriminatory practices in U.S. courts).
25. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Execut-
ing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. Ir'L L. 129, 152 (1999) (explain-
ing that because treaty is non-self-executing does not mean that it cannot be directly
applied by U.S. courts); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Indi-
viduals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1143 (1992) (stating that cause of action under treaty
itself is not necessary if treaty is invoked as defense or enforced pursuant to domestic
common law forms of action).
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criminal defendant, for example, could invoke a right under a
non-self-executing treaty as a defense to criminal charges. 26
Invoking CERD as a defense to a death sentence on the
grounds of disproportional racial impact would provide an op-
portunity for U.S. courts to reexamine McClesky in light of
CERD.2 7 McClesky has foreclosed subsequent claims by death
row inmates who demonstrate that the death penalty is imposed
in a racially discriminatory manner.2  That more U.S. states are
legalizing the death penalty29 and executing more prisoners30 in-
creases the significance of racial disparity in death penalty
cases.
3 1
26. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 214 (stating that where defendant in civil or criminal
proceeding by government invokes human rights treaty in defense, court should reach
merits of claim unless it is frivolous, relief is available under domestic law, or there is
another forum to adjudicate claim).
27. See generally id. at 219-20 (stating that human rights treaties such as CERD
could provide remedies for individuals who allege violations of rights that are arguably
protected under those treaties, but not protected under constitutional, statutory, or
common law).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
933 (1994) (rejecting death row inmate's claim that Illinois death penalty statute was
applied in racially discriminatory manner and basing decision on U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in McClesky); Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307,
1310 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting inmate's allegation of discrimination that was based on
statistics that state granted white rapists parole more often than black rapists and find-
ing that McClesky foreclosed inmate's claim absent showing of discriminatory purpose of
decisionmakers).
29. See Report of United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum: Mission to the United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, -I
45 (1998) (visited Mar. 2, 1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrrep/
98chr68a3.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Special
Rapporteur's Report]. Kansas and New York reinstated the death penalty in 1994 and
1995, respectively. Id. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted laws increasing the number
of aggravating circumstances that qualify a murder as a capital case. Id. 47. The
federal government reintroduced the death penalty in 1988 through the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act and expanded its use in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994. Id. 48.
Currently, 40 U.S. jurisdictions, including 38 states, the federal government, and the
U.S. military, have death penalty statutes. Amnesty International USA, RetentionistJuris-
dictions in the United States (visited Mar. 2, 1999) <http://amnestyusa.org/abolish/reten-
tionist.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
30. See Amnesty International USA, U.S. Executions by Year Since 1976 (visited Mar.
2, 1999) <http://amnestyusa.org/abolish/exesince76.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (stating that there were 68 executions in 1998, 38 executions
in 1993, and 11 executions in 1988).
31. See, e.g., ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Recommenda-
tion 107 (1997) (calling for moratorium on all executions until death penalty cases are
administered fairly and impartially without discrimination based on race).
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This Note addresses U.S. obligations under CERD in the
context of racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty
and proposes courses of domestic and international action. Part
I examines the historical racial disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty in the United States. It discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in McClesky to deny relief to a death
row inmate who demonstrated that race influenced whether a
death sentence was imposed. Part I also explores the develop-
ment of CERD and discusses CERD's standard for proving dis-
crimination based on a showing of racially discriminatory effect.
Finally, Part I addresses the U.S. ratification of CERD and its res-
ervations to the treaty. Part II explores commentators' varying
positions on CERD's applicability in the United States in light of
the declaration making CERD a non-self-executing treaty. Part
II also addresses the divergence of U.S. standards for proving
discrimination, which generally require a showing of discrimina-
tory purpose, from those under CERD, which recognize claims
based on a showing of discriminatory effect. Part III argues that
despite the non-self-executing declaration, death row inmates
who demonstrate that the death penalty disproportionately af-
fects their racial group may invoke CERD as a defense. This part
also asserts that because U.S. standards for proving discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice context diverge from the standards
set forth under CERD, U.S. courts should address the merits of
claims invoking CERD as a defense. Finally, Part III encourages
State Parties besides the United States to use the treaty's enforce-
nent mechanisms to challenge the United States' the non-self-
executing declaration as being incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty and to protest its failure to address racial
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty as a violation of
CERD. This Note concludes that CERD has the potential to be a
powerful tool to address racial disparity in death penalty cases in
the United States.
I. RACIAL DISPARITY IN U.S. DEATH PENALTY CASES AND
THE STANDARDS FOR PROVING DISCRIMINATION
UNDER CRD
Commentators in the United States and in the international
community have observed that the imposition of the death pen-
alty in the United States has a discriminatory impact on racial
1999] 2275
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minorities.32  In McClesky, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a death sentence on the grounds that
the defendant failed to prove that the state acted with a racially
discriminatory purpose by imposing his sentence.33 The Court
found that McClesky's evidence indicating that the death penalty
had a racially disproportionate effect on blacks34 was insufficient
to demonstrate discriminatory purpose.35 Seven years later in
1994, the United States ratified CERD, which requires State Par-
ties to review, amend, or nullify laws and practices that have a
racially discriminatory effect.3 6 The United States, however, in-
cluded a declaration stating that the Convention was non-self-
executing, which precludes U.S. citizens from invoking private
causes of action under CERD.3 7 Numerous commentators have
criticized the non-self-executing declaration as preventing the
extension of CERD's protections to U.S. citizens, 8 noting that
32. See 140 CONG. REC. S12309-02, S12311 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1994) [hereinafter
Violent Crime Act Debate] (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that issues of race, class, and
quality of counsel influence who receives death penalty); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES (Feb. 1990), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S8263-01, S8272 (daily ed. June 20, 1991)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (finding pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in
charging, sentencing, and imposition of death penalty in United States); Special Rap-
porteur's Report, supra note 29, 1 62 (noting that race, class, and economic status are
considered key elements affecting imposition of death penalty); Stephen B. Bright, Dis-
crimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of the Racial Discrimination in Infliction of Death
Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 433, 434 (1995) (noting that majority of those sen-
tenced to death committed crimes against white victims); Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism
Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777, 778
(1990-1991) (noting that defendant is more likely to receive death penalty if victim is
white).
33. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (finding that evidence of racial
disparities in imposition of death penalty does not demonstrate that decisionmakers in
McClesky's case acted with discriminatory purpose).
34. See id. at 287 (noting that Baldus Study indicates that black defendants, such as
McClesky, who kill white victims, have greatest likelihood of receiving death penalty).
35. See id. at 297-99 (finding that Baldus Study's suggestion that death penalty had
racially disproportionate effect did not demonstrate that Georgia had violated Equal
Protection Clause).
36. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218 (stating that State Parties must
take steps to address laws and practices that have effect of creating or perpetuating
discrimination).
37. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Conrad K.
Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
38. See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic
Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 How. L.J.
571, 588 (1997) (noting that non-self-executing declaration denies U.S. citizens access
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CERD's protections against discriminatory effect would provide
more remedies for discrimination than currently available under
U.S. law.39
A. Racial Disparity in the Imposition of the Death Penalt in the
United States
A stronger statistical connection between race and the im-
position of the death penalty exists than between smoking and
heart disease.40 Commentators have linked the current disparity
to the historical racial inequality in the United States.4" In the
first half of the twentieth century, Southern states used the death
penalty as a vehicle of racial violence against African-Ameri-
cans. 42 While the U.S. Supreme Court declared the death pen-
alty unconstitutional in 1972 due to arbitrariness and discrimina-
tion, 4 3 it upheld the death penalty in 1976, finding that states
had incorporated sufficient protections into their death penalty
statutes.' In 1987, the Court rejected McClesky's claim that the
death penalty was imposed in discriminatory manner, despite ev-
idence indicating that race influenced the imposition of the
to domestic legal remedies under CERD); Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (stating that non-
self-executing declaration nullifies CERD's effect).
39. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 585 (stating that because courts have held that
Fourteenth Amendment requires proof of discriminatory purpose in addition to effect,
Article 2(1) (c) of CERD may extend beyond current constitutional protections); Taifa,
supra note 21, at 670 (noting that issues of race discrimination in U.S. criminal justice
system may violate CERD provisions condemning practices that have racially discrimina-
tory effect).
40. Tabak, supra note 32, at 781. A study of race in death sentencing in Georgia
showed that defendants charged with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive
a death sentence than those charged with killing blacks. Id. Smokers are 1.7 times
more likely to die of coronary artery disease than non-smokers of similar ages. Id.
Tabak notes that while smoking greatly increases the chance of dying from heart dis-
ease, smoking has a lesser impact statistically than the effect of victim's race on capital
sentencing. Id.
41. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 334-35 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(finding that Georgia's legacy of racism in criminal justice system influences current
racial disparities in death penalty cases); Bright, supra note 32, at 439 (stating that
death penalty descends from lynchings and other forms of racial violence).
42. See Bright, supra note 32, at 440 (noting that after abolition of slavery, South-
ern states implemented disparate punishments based on race of victim and defendant).
43. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that
imposition of death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
44. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (finding that states' newly-
enacted death penalty statutes addressed concerns in Furman, by specifying factors to be
weighed and procedures to be followed in carrying out death sentences).
1999] 2277
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death penalty.45
1. Historical Racial Inequality in the Imposition of the
Death Penalty
Commentators note that during the period of U.S. slavery
and the early twentieth century, the death penalty epitomized
racial inequality in the United States.4 6 Several U.S. Supreme
CourtJustices cited racial discrimination in the imposition of the
death penalty as grounds for declaring it unconstitutional in
1972. 47 Although the Court in 1976 found that states' newly-en-
acted death penalty statutes met constitutional requirements, 4
critics note that race continues to influence imposition of the
death penalty.49
According to some authors, the death penalty today is a
relic of slavery and racial violence in the United States.5 ° From
45. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (rejecting equal protection claim
on grounds that McClesky proved neither that decisionmakers acted with discrimina-
tory purpose in his case nor that state of Georgia acted with discriminatory purpose in
maintaining death penalty). The Court also rejected the petitioner's claim that the
Georgia's death sentencing process violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 308.
46. See Christopher R. Adamson, Punishment After Slavery: Southern State Penal Sys-
tems, 1865-1890, in RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: RACE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 3 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) [hereinafter RAcE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (noting
that slave masters forced slaves to witness public hangings to symbolize their control);
Bright, supra note 32, at 440 (stating that lynching of blacks by whites in early twentieth
century constituted means of racial control).
47. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (reversing two Georgia death sentences and one
Texas death sentence as constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that
"discretion ofjudges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be
selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised,
and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority");
id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that "Negroes were executed far more
often than whites in proportion to their percentage of their population").
48. See Gregg 428 U.S. at 206-07 (finding that Georgia death penalty statute suffi-
ciently protected against arbitrariness and did not violate Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
49. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (finding that "despite the efforts of the states and the courts to
devise legal formulas and procedural rules.., the death penalty remains fraught with
arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake"); Hugo Adam Bedau, The United
States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 62 (Peter Hodgkinson &
Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) (noting that death penalty in United States is more
likely to be used on racial minorities and poor); Bright, supra note 32, at 434 (asserting
that race and poverty continue to determine who receives death penalty).
50. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stat-
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colonial times through the U.S. Civil War, criminal law in many
states differentiated between crimes committed by and against
blacks and whites. 1 Between 1882 and 1927, lynch mobs killed
approximately 4951 people, seventy-five percent of whom were
African-American. 5
2
In the 1920s, fearing that Congress would enact an anti-
lynching statute, Southern states began to substitute the judicial
process for lynchings.5" State officials assured lynch mobs that
black defendants charged with capital offenses would receive a
quick trial and a death sentence if the mobs let the criminal jus-
tice system proceed.54 Courts conducted capital trials hastily, at
times in less than an hour, often with angry mobs outside the
courthouse demanding the death penalty. 55 The criminal courts
in the South became a significant vehicle for racial violence.56
Between 1924 and 1972, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared
ing that history of disparate treatment of blacks and whites in Georgia's criminal justice
system influences its administration of death penalty); Bright, supra note 32, at 439-41
(discussing disparate punishments for blacks and whites in pre-Civil War legal codes as
predecessor to current racial disparities in death penalty).
51. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that in colonial
period, black slaves who killed whites were automatically executed irrespective of
whether it was in self-defense or in defense of another). Georgia law, for example,
provided that the rape of a white female by a black man was punishable by death, while
the rape of a white female by anyone else was punishable by jail for two to twenty years.
Bright, supra note 32, at 439. It provided that the rape of a black female be punished by
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Id.
52. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 46 (statement of Wade
Henderson, NAACP) (noting that lynchings were not recorded until 1882).
53. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Pro-
hibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptoiy Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 80 (1990)
(noting that because all-white juries would routinely impose death sentences on ac-
cused blacks, there were fewer lynchings in 1930s).
54. See Bright, supra note 32, at 440 (describing Southern capital trials in 1930s as
"legal lynchings").
55. See id. at 441 (noting Kentucky case in which black man was hung immediately
after his trial that lasted under an hour).
56. See id. at 440-41 (noting that Southern legal system molded itself to lynch
mobs' demands). In 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama reversed death
sentences of nine black teenagers, known as the "Scottsboro Boys," who were convicted
of raping two white women. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing death
sentences on grounds that defendants had inadequate defense counsel). The verdicts
for the death penalty in Scottsboro, Alabama, which were reached while lynch mobs
clamored outside the courthouse, caused national outrage over the lack of justice in
Southern capital trials. See Dan T. Carter, A Reasonable Doubt, in RACE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 16-24 (discussing subsequent retrial of Scottsboro case, which
revealed fabrication of victims' accounts).
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the death penalty unconstitutional,57 Georgia executed 337
blacks and seventy-five whites.58
In 1972, the Court held in Furman v. Georgia, a short per
curiam opinion, that the death penalty as then implemented was
unconstitutional and constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.59 Sev-
eral Justices cited racial discrimination as a factor in their deci-
sion to declare the death penalty unconstitutional.6 ° After
Furman, states began redrafting their capital punishment statutes
to conform to the Court's standards for preventing discrimina-
tion and arbitrariness.6'
In 1976, the Court upheld a death sentence in Gregg v. Geor-
gia and found that Georgia's new death penalty statute ad-
dressed the constitutional demands of Furman.62 In Gregg, the
Court pointed to procedural safeguards such as separate guilt
and sentencing hearings,63 the requirement that the jury find at
least one aggravating circumstance, 64 the opportunity for the de-
fendant to introduce any mitigating circumstances, 65 and the au-
tomatic appeal of all death sentences.66  Despite protections
against discrimination and arbitrariness in new capital punish-
ment laws, some commentators note that the broad discretion of
57. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that death
penalty was applied in arbitrary and discriminatory manner that violated Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
58. Bright, supra note 32, at 441.
59. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (reversing Georgia death sentences for defend-
ants convicted of murder and rape and Texas death sentence for defendant convicted
of rape).
60. See id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that discretion of judges and
juries allowed racial prejudices to influence imposition of death penalty); id. at 364
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that blacks are executed in numbers far higher than
their proportion of population).
61. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (noting that at least thirty-five
states re-enacted their death penalty statutes in response to Furman).
62. See id. at 206-07 (finding that Georgia's death penalty statute provided ade-
quate protections against arbitrariness and capriciousness).
63. See id. at 191-92 (noting that "bifircated" trial that allows jury to decide guilt
before it decides sentence permits jury to consider evidence of aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors that may have been irrelevant in determination of guilt).
64. See id. at 206 (finding that this requirement channels juries' discretion in im-
posing death penalty).
65. See id. at 197 (stating that this requirement focuses juries' attention on particu-
lar characteristics of individual defendant and avoids arbitrariness).
66. See id. at 198 (asserting that automatic appeal permits Georgia's supreme court
to review each death sentence to ensure it was not influenced by passion or prejudice).
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prosecutors in deciding whether to seek the death penalty67 and
of juries68 in deciding whether to impose the death penalty per-
mits racial prejudices to influence their decisions.69
2. McClesky v. Kemp
The U.S. Supreme Court in McClesky found that statistical
evidence indicating that the death penalty disproportionately af-
fected blacks was not sufficient to reverse McClesky's death sen-
tence.7 ° The majority held that to succeed on the equal protec-
tion claim, McClesky would have to demonstrate that the state
acted with a discriminatory purpose when it imposed his death
67. See Bright, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that prosecutor who believes blacks
are prone to violence and morally inferior may be more likely to seek death penalty if
defendant is black, and especially if victim is white). In the Southern states, including
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and Texas, where the death penalty is
most frequently used, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions ("Special Rapporteur") noted that there were very few black district
attorneys, who are elected officials with broad discretion to decide whether to seek the
death penalty. See Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 63. In Alabama, there is
one black district attorney out of 67. Id. In Georgia, which has 159 counties, there are
none. Id. The Special Rapporteur's report expressed concern that the election of state
judges, rather than appointment, affects their independence, particularly on the issue
of death penalty. Id. 99 71, 74.
68. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (finding that "a juror who believes
that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that
belief in deciding whether [the] crime involved aggravating factors"). A juror's racial
biases might prevent him or her from considering evidence of mitigating factors, such
as the life and background of the accused. Id. The Special Rapporteur noted that
despite protections against the use of race in peremptory jury challenges, in practice,
prosecutors were able to eliminate all black jurors from the jury pool through use of
peremptory challenges. See Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 86. This enabled
black defendants to be tried and sentenced to death before all-white juries. Id. He also
found that excluding potential jurors in capital cases if they oppose the death penalty
will exclude disproportionate numbers of minorities because they are more likely to
oppose it. Id. 88.
69. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (stating that "[e]ven under the most sophisticated death pen-
alty statutes, race continues to play a major role in determining who shall live and who
shall die"); Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 62 (acknowledging that racial
prejudices of lawyers, prosecutors, juries, and judges contributed to their decisions to
impose death penalty); Bright, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that same racial prejudices
that affect jurors also affect prosecutors, defense lawyers, law enforcement officials, and
judges, in their attitudes towards accused and how they exercise discretion in imposing
death penalty).
70. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (finding that statistical study
was insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory purpose by those who sentenced defend-
ant to death).
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sentence.71 The dissenters agreed that discriminatory purpose
was necessary to succeed on an equal protection claim,72 but
noted that a showing of disparate impact can be sufficient to in-
fer discriminatory purpose.73
To support his claim that the death penalty was imposed in
a racially discriminatory manner, McClesky presented the Baldus
Study, a complex statistical analysis that examined over 2000
murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s.74 The study demonstrated
that in Georgia between 1976 and 1980, defendants charged
with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death
penalty than those charged with killing blacks.7 5 It concluded
that black defendants charged with killing whites were more
likely to receive a death sentence than any other racial combina-
tion.76 The study also found that prosecutors would more fre-
quently seek the, death penalty when the victim was white and
the defendant was black.77 Specifically, the study found that
prosecutors sought the death penalty in seventy percent of the
cases involving black defendants and white victims, in thirty-two
percent of the cases with white defendants and white victims, in
nineteen percent of the cases with white defendants and black
victims, and in fifteen percent of the cases with black defendants
and black victims. 78
Justice Powell, writing for a five to four majority, rejected
the equal protection claim on the grounds that McClesky failed
to show that the decision makers acted with a discriminatory pur-
71. See id. at 292 (stating that defendant must prove that decisionmakers acted
with discriminatory purpose).
72. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that criminal
defendant must prove purposeful discrimination to allege equal protection violation).
73. See id. (stating that defendant may establish prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination by demonstrating totality of circumstances giving rise to inference of dis-
criminatory purpose) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986)).
74. See id. at 286-87 (stating that Professor Baldus subjected his data to 230 vari-
ables that could have explained disparities on nonracial grounds).
75. See id. at 287 (discussing findings from Baldus Study).
76. Id.
77. Id. Baldus noted that in highly aggravated cases, racial prejudices become ir-
relevant because the decisionmakers have less discretion. Id. at 287 n.5. He explained
that racial factors play a significant role in "mid-range" cases where decisionmakers can
exercise discretion. Id.
78. Id. Baldus took 230 variables into account that could have explained the dis-
crepancy on non-racial grounds. Id. He found that the effects of racial bias were most
significant in cases where the crime was not "tremendously aggravated" and where the
decisionmakers had the most discretion. Id. at n.5.
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pose.79 Relying on Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Fee-
ney, 8° an employment discrimination case, the majority found
that to demonstrate discriminatory purpose, McClesky would
have to show that Georgia maintained its death penalty statute in
order to produce a racially discriminatory result.81 Because the
Court found that Georgia had a legitimate reason for adopting
and maintaining its death penalty statute,82 it held that the dis-
criminatory impact shown by the Baldus Study alone was not suf-
ficient to infer discriminatory purpose.83
The majority rejected the Eighth Amendment claim that
Georgia applied the death penalty in an arbitrary manner in
which racial prejudices influenced whether prosecutors seek the
death penalty and whether juries impose the death penalty.84
While the majority acknowledged the risk that racial prejudice
may influence a jury's decision, 5 it did not find that risk to be
constitutionally unacceptable.86 The Court found that statistical
disparities would inevitably result from the necessary discretion
given to prosecutors and juries.87
79. See id. at 297 (finding that to prevail on equal protection claim, defendant
must show that Georgia enacted or maintained death penalty statute for discriminatory
purpose).
80. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (finding that
state's awareness that civil service hiring preference for veterans operated against wo-
men was insufficient to maintain equal protection claim because decisionmaker did not
act because of anticipated discriminatory impact).
81. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
82. See id. at 298-99 (finding that because state legislature has wide discretion in
choosing criminal laws and penalties, there were legitimate reasons for Georgia to
adopt and maintain death penalty).
83. See id. (finding that McClesky did not show that Georgia maintains its death
penalty statute to produce racially discriminatory impact suggested by Baldus Study).
84. See id. at 308-09 (stating that because Georgia's death sentencing procedures
focus discretion on particularized nature of crime and characteristics of defendant, Mc-
Clesky's sentence was not disproportionate under Eighth Amendment).
85. See id. at 308 (explaining that statistics only show likelihood that race entered
into some decisions, but do not actually prove that race actually entered those deci-
sions).
86. See id. at 308-09 (holding that Baldus study did not constitute constitutionally
unacceptable risk of racial prejudice entering into death sentencing decisions); cf. id. at
335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that because death is irrevocable punishment,
it demands greater degree of scrutiny than other punishments) (citing California v. Ra-
mos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
87. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that "prosecutorial discretion to pro-
vide individualized justice" is deep-seated in U.S. law and that juries must make "diffi-
cult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification"); cf id. at 335-36 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (opining that "[d]iscretion is a means, not an end ... bestowed in order
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The majority raised the additional concern that accepting
McClesky's claim would open a floodgate to numerous chal-
lenges to criminal penalties by members of minority groups.8 8 It
concluded that the legislature was the appropriate body to ad-
dress sentencing issues rather than the courts.8 9 The Court rea-
soned that Congress was better able to evaluate the conflicting
considerations necessary to develop an appropriate remedy for
discrimination.9 °
Dissenting in McClesky, Justice Blackmun criticized the ma-
jority's equal protection analysis.91 He asserted that the Court
departed from its ordinary equal protection analysis by not ap-
plying the three-part test for prima facie discrimination articu-
lated in Castaneda v. Partida.9 2 Under that test, a defendant
must show that he or she is a member of a distinct class, establish
a substantial degree of differential treatment, and show that the
allegedly discriminatory procedure is subject to abuse or is not
racially neutral.9" Justice Blackmun stated that McClesky would
have fulfilled the requirements of this test because he was a
member of a distinct group, because the Baldus Study demon-
strated different treatment of that group, and because there was
sufficient evidence that the Georgia death penalty was subject to
abuse, noting broad prosecutorial discretion and the lack of
to permit the sentencer to 'trea[t] each defendant in a capital case with that degree of
respect due the uniqueness of the individual'" and that importance of discretion
should not prevent Court from examining evidence that race more likely than not in-
fluences capital sentencing.
88. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 315-16 (explaining that accepting McClesky's claim
would permit other challenges to sentences based on unexplained discrepancies that
correlate to membership in any minority group or gender). The Court noted that the
Eighth Amendment applies to all penalties, not solely the death penalty. Id. at 314
(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983)).
89. See id. at 319 (finding that legislature has responsibility of determining appro-
priate punishment for particular crimes). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld statutes
designed to address racial discrimination where it held that such relief was not directly
mandated by the Constitution. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding
legislation dispensing with use of literacy tests in state and federal elections); Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-50, 657-58 (1966) (upholding section of Voting
Rights Act, which invalidated New York's English literacy requirement).
90. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
91. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 364 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's
assertion that necessity of discretion in criminal justice system demanded "exceptionally
clear proof," before inferring abuse "misses the point" of defendant's equal protection
claim).
92. Id. at 361-62 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
93. Id.
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guidelines.94 When the defendant makes a prima facie case
under Castaneda, the burden of proof shifts from the defendant
to the prosecution to rebut the allegation.95 Justice Blackmun
concluded that because the state's evidence consisted mainly of
assertions that it did not discriminate, the disparity in death sen-
tencing was not explainable on any basis other than race and
accordingly constituted an equal protection violation.96
3. Post-McClesky Developments
After McClesky, studies conducted by the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office97 ("GAO") in 1990 and the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions"
("Special Rapporteur") in 1998 concluded that the race of de-
fendant and the race of the victim influence whether the death
penalty is imposed in the United States.9 9 Moreover, in response
to McClesky, the U.S. Congress twice attempted to pass legislation
that would provide death row inmates with an opportunity to
challenge a death sentence by demonstrating racial dispari-
ties.1"' The legislation, however, failed to attract a majority of
94. Id. at 353-58. Blackmun also noted that these factors, along with the history of
racial discrimination in Georgia's criminal justice system, established a prima facie case.
Id.
95. Id. at 359.
96. Id. at 361 (citing standard developed in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
97. See U.S. General Accounting Office (visited May 15, 1999) <http://www.gao.gov/>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that U.S. General Account-
ing Office ("GAO") is investigative arm of U.S. Congress and performs audits and evalu-
ations of U.S. government programs and activities).
98. See David Weissbrodt, The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the U.N Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 685 (1986) (stating that U.N. Commission on
Human Rights appointed Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions in 1982 to study those human rights problems, to receive complaints about
impending or past executions, to issue appeals to governments, and to report publicly
on his or her activity).
99. See Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 62 (noting that race, class, and
economic status affect imposition of death penalty); GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at
S8272 (finding pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in charging, sentencing,
and imposition of death penalty in United States).
100. See 140 CONG. Rc. S5328-01 (daily ed. May 6, 1994) [hereinafter Racial Justice
Act Debate] (setting forth debate on Racial Justice Act, which would have permitted
death row inmates to challenge death sentence by demonstrating evidence of racial
disparity in death sentencing); 137 CONG. Rxc. H8184-03 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991)
[hereinafter Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Debate] (setting forth debate on Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act, which was similar to Racial Justice Act).
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votes.''
The GAO examined twenty-eight studies on racial dispari-
ties in the imposition of the death penalty. 10 2 In February 1990,
the GAO issued a report 0 3 ("GAO Report") affirming the valid-
ity of those studies0 4 and determined that a defendant in the
United States was far more likely to receive the death penalty in
a capital murder case if the victim was white rather than black.10 5
The GAO Report, mandated by federal statute,10 6 found consis-
tency in the data collection and quality of the studies'0 7 as well as
a pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in many areas around the country.10 8
International human rights observers have also recognized
racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in the
United States. 0 9 In January 1998, the Special Rapporteur issued
a report 10 indicating that the death penalty was imposed in the
101. See Racial Justice Act Debate, supra note 100, at S5328 (stating sense of Senate
that it should reject Racial Justice Act and omit it from 1994 crime legislation); Fairness
in Death Sentencing Act Debate, supra note 100, at H8145 (rejecting Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act and voting to enact Equal Justice Act, which prohibits use of statistical
evidence of racial disparities in death sentencing).
102. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at S8271 (stating that GAO initially reviewed
53 studies for appropriateness and overall quality and based its assessment on 28 of
those studies).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 88272 (noting that while studies' methodologies were not of equal
quality and had limitations, they were of sufficient quality to support finding of racial
disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of death penalty).
105. See id. (stating that synthesis of studies indicates "strong race of victim influ-
ence"). • I
106. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4392
(1988), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(o) (2) (1994) (requiring GAO to study capital sen-
tencing procedures to determine whether either race of victim or defendant influences
likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to death).
107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at S8271 (stating that studies addressing dis-
crimination in death sentencing was of sufficient quality and quantity to warrant evalua-
tion synthesis approach). In using the evaluation synthesis approach, the GAO ex-
amined the applicable studies for their quality, extracted all relevant information, and
compared information across the studies to identify similarities and differences in the
findings. Id. The major benefit of this approach is that evidence from multiple studies
can provide greater support from a finding than evidence from an individual study. Id.
108. See id. at S8272 (stating that GAO's "synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pat-
tern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposi-
tion of the death penalty").
109. See Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 62 (stating that race, class, and
economic status are said to influence whether death penalty is imposed).
110. See id. 1-2 (noting that Special Rapporteur visited United States after re-
ceiving information about discriminatory and arbitrary use of death penalty).
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United States in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner.1 1 ' The
Special Rapporteur stated that race and economic status of the
defendant and the victim played a role in death sentencing."12
Noting that the McClesky majority placed a difficult burden
on defendants to demonstrate that individual acts of discrimina-
tion affected their cases, the Special Rapporteur noted that the
decision permits U.S. courts to tolerate racial bias in death pen-
alty cases." 3 Since that decision, death row inmates have raised
challenges to the constitutionality of state death penalty statutes
on the grounds that they have a discriminatory impact against
racial minorities. 114 Circuit courts of appeals that have consid-
ered similar cases have denied relief based largely on the Court's
holding in McClesky. 15
B. The International Convention on. the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
Since World War II, racial equality and non-discrimination
have become fundamental principles of international law," 6
which the U.N. Charter articulates." 7 CERD codifies these prin-
Ill. Id. 1 2.
112. Id. 62.
113. See Special Rapporteur's Report, supra note 29, 65, 67 (noting that Racial
Justice Act, which Senate defeated in 1994, would have permitted petitioners to use
statistics to demonstrate racial inequities and removed need to prove discriminatory
intent by individuals or institutions).
114. See, e.g., Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 933
(1994) (relying on McClesky to reject death row inmate's constitutional challenge of
Illinois death penalty statute); see also Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Pa-
roles, 851 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1988) (relying on McClesky to reject inmate's claim of
discrimination based on statistics that white rapists were granted parole more often
than black rapists).
115. Id.
116. See NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
24 (1991) (stating that non-discrimination is well-established in international law); WAR-
WICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 46 (1983)
(noting post-World War II principle of universal respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all); McDougall, supra note 38, at 577-78 (discussing centrality of
equality and non-discrimination in U.N. human rights system); Meron, supra note 23, at
283 (stating that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
discriminating based on race is norm of customary international law).
117. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (promoting respect for human rights without
discriminating based on race); CERD, supra note 14, pmbl., at 212 (considering that
one purpose of United Nations is to promote and encourage universal respect of
human rights without discriminating based on race); see also Meron, supra note 23, at
283 (describing respect for human rights without discriminating based on race as fun-
damental norm of U.N. Charter).
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ciples and its substantive provisions define the obligations of
State Parties to take steps toward eradicating racially discrimina-
tory laws and practices. 118 CERD also creates several mecha-
nisms to monitor State Parties' implementation.of the treaty and
to address violations." 9
1. The Development of CERD
CERD contains comprehensive and legally enforceable pro-
visions that provide the international community with an instru-
ment to combat racial discrimination. 12  The United Nations
first conceptualized CERD121 in response to anti-Semitic inci-
dents occurring in Europe in the 1960s. 1 22 CERD, however, does
not' specify anti-Semitism or other forms of racial hatred other
than apartheid. 123 The Convention drew much of its political
support from newly-independent African, Asian, and other de-
veloping states and reflected the desire of the United Nations to
end discrimination against non-white persons.124
118. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218 (requiring nations that have
ratified CERD ("State Parties") "to review, amend, or nullify any laws and regulations
which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it ex-
ists"); see also Taifa, supra note 21, at 648 (noting that CERD requires State Parties to
eliminate racial discrimination within their borders and to enact whatever laws are nec-
essary to ensure human rights without discrimination).
119. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 6, at 222 (assuring individuals' right to hearing
before competent national tribunal for acts that violate rights under CERD); id. art. 8,
at 224 (establishing Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (,"CERD Com-
mittee")); id. art. 9, at 224 (requiring State Parties to file annual reports indicating their
progress implementing CERD); id. art. 11, at 226 (authorizing State Parties to bring
complaints against other State Parties that violate CERD); id. art. 14, at 230 (permitting
State Parties to adopt optional provision authorizing CERD Committee to hear individ-
ual complaints from their jurisdictions); id. art. 22, at 236-38 (empowering Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") to hear disputes between two or more State Parties).
120. See Meron, supra note 23, at 283 (discussing CERD's significance as enforcea-
ble instrument in international efforts to confront racial discrimination).
121. See id. at 284 (noting that U.N. organs including Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights,
and Economic and Social Council, participated in drafting CERD).
122. See LERNER, supra note 116, at 46 (explaining that pressure for international
legislation against racial discrimination originated in 1960s from "swastika epidemic"
and other anti-Semitic incidents occurring in Europe).
123. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 3, at 218 (stating that "State Parties particularly
condemn racial segregation and apartheid"); see also LERNER, supra note 116, at 46
(describing how anti-Semitism inspired CERD, but explaining that CERD's drafters did
not specify it in CERD itself).
124. See LERNER, supra note 116, at 46 (noting that support of Third World nations
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Since the U.N. General Assembly adopted CERD in 1965125
and CERD's entry into force in 1969,126 more nations have rati-
fied the Convention 12 7 than any other treaty other than the Ge-
neva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. 128 The
United States signed CERD in 1966.129 President Jimmy Carter
transmitted the convention to the U.S. Senate for its advice and
consent for ratification in 1978.13° The Senate did not authorize
ratification of CERD until 1994.131
2. Standards for Proving Discrimination Under CERD
CERD defines racial discrimination as practices that have a
discriminatory purpose or effect. 132 It mandates State Parties to
amend, revise, or nullify such laws and practices.1 3 CERD also
that were eager to have anti-racist instrument adopted by United Nations was crucial to
CERD's success).
125. CERD, supra note 14.
126. Id.
127. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.un.org/depts/treaty.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (stating that 153 states have ratified CERD).
128. Meron, supra note 23, at 284. Currently, 177 states have ratified the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF PoLicV, LAW AND PRACTICE 910
(3d ed. 1995) (noting that multilateral treaties that address international human rights
violations relating to armed conflicts are more widely ratified than international human
rights treaties generally).
129. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 6 (statement of Sen. Clai-
borne Pell, Foreign Relations Committee Chair).
130." See id. (noting that Reagan and Bush Administrations did not support ratifica-
tion of CERD).
131. CERD Ratification, supra note 13.
132. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 1 (1), at 216 (stating that term "racial discrimina-
tion" includes distinctions based on race that have "the purpose or effect" of impairing
human rights).
133. Id. art. 2(1), at 216-18. Article 2(1) of CERD states in part:
State parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimina-
tion in all its forms and promoting understanding among races, and to this
end:
(a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial
discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and
to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation;
(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support racial
discrimination by any persons or organizations;
(c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmen-
tal, national, and local policies, and to amend, rescind, or nullify any
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directs State Parties to provide all citizens with equality before
the law and before criminal justice tribunals without discriminat-
ing on the basis of race.1" 4
Article 1(1) of CERD defines racial discrimination as any
distinction based on race or ethnicity that has the purpose or
effect of impairing the exercise of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedom in any area of public life, including the economic,
political, social, or cultural spheres." 5 The subjective intent of
the act shows whether its purpose is discriminatory, while its ob-
jective consequences demonstrate whether it has a discrimina-
tory effect.136 The presence of either discriminatory purpose or
effect is sufficient to qualify as discrimination under CERD. l3 7
One commentator notes that when a state makes distinc-
tions explicitly on the basis of race to impair the exercise of
rights, demonstrating a violation under CERD is not difficult be-
cause the discriminatory purpose will likely be visible from the
policy, law, or practice in question.'38 Showing the existence of
discriminatory effect, however, may require substantial informa-
tion that is sufficiently specific, yet broad enough, to demon-
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating
racial discrimination wherever it exists;
(d) Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropri-
ate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial
discrimination by any persons, group, or legislation.
Id.
134. Id. art. 5(a), at 220. Article 5 of CERD states in part:
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this
Convention, State Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial dis-
crimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without
distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before
the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:
(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other or-
gans administering justice;
(b) The right to security of person and protection by the state against
violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or
by any individual group or institution.
Id.
135. Id. art. 1(1), at 216.
136. LERNER, supra note 116, at 49.
137. See id. (explaining that for act to be considered discriminatory under CERD,
it must be based on race and have purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing human
rights and fundamental freedoms).
138. See Meron, supra note 23, at 287 (noting distinction between facts that shows
discriminatory purpose and those that show discriminatory effect).
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strate that effect over time.l"9 For this reason, discriminatory ef-
fect can be difficult to demonstrate. °
Some commentators believe that the drafters of CERD in-
tended the Convention to apply only to those acts that had a
racial motivation,"' which would appear to limit its reach to pur-
poseful discrimination. 4 2 Yet one author asserts that the word
"effect" in CERD's definition of racial discrimination indicates
that acts for which a discriminatory purpose could not be
demonstrated may be brought within the scope of CERD by in-
ferring discriminatory purpose from their effect.'4 The refer-
ence in CERD's preamble to the enjoyment of certain rights
without any differentiation on the basis of race" demonstrates
that CERD's goal is to achieve equality of result. 45
Article 2 obligates State Parties to develop policies to elimi-
nate racial discrimination within their borders and to enact any
laws that are necessary to ensure the exercise of fundamental
human rights free from discrimination.' 4 6 Article 2(2) allows
States Parties to carry out their obligations when the circum-
stances warrant such action,'4 7 providing flexibility to State Par-
139. See id. (explaining that discriminatory effect can be difficult to establish, par-
ticularly when it is attributed to impact of economic policies and practices on ethnic
groups that are already economically disadvantaged).
140. See id. (noting that sufficiently detailed information may not always be avail-
able); Taifa, supra note 21, at 670 (stating that disparate racial impact in context of
selective prosecution may be difficult to prove, but still pervasive).
141. See LERNER, supra note 116, at 49 (noting that CERD's drafters intended defi-
nition of racial discrimination to cover all acts of discrimination as long as they were
based on racial motivation); see also Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at
33 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of State) (stating that CERD does not
seek to invalidate every race-neutral law that causes some adverse racial impact, only
those with unjustifiable disparate impact).
142. See Meron, supra note 23, at 288 (noting that some commentators believe that
CERD only addresses racially motivated discrimination).
143. See id. at 288 (explaining that consequences of certain acts may be indicative
of decisionmaker's intent).
144. See CERD, supra note 14, pmbl., at 212-14 (" [c]onsidering that... all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all
the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to
race, colour or national origin") (emphasis added).
145. See Meron, supra note 23, at 288 (stating CERD's preamble demonstrates that
its goal is defacto equality).
146. CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1), at 218.
147. Id. art. 2(2), at 218. Article 2(2) of CERD states in part:
State Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take in the social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and other fields, certain and concrete measures to ensure
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals
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ties.148 Article 1(4) empowers State Parties to ensure advance-
ment and protection to certain racial groups as they see fit.'49
While these affirmative action measures would be premised
upon race, they are not considered racial discrimination unless
they lead to the maintenance of different rights for different ra-
cial groups or continued after the objectives for which they were
achieved had been met. 150
Article 5 specifies the basic obligations stated in Article 2.'15
The article states that State Parties must guarantee individuals
equality before the law without discriminating on the basis of
race. 1 2 This guarantee has both a negative aspect, which re-
quires State Parties to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimina-
tion, and a positive aspect, which obligates State Parties to guar-
antee equality before the law.'15  It has been noted that the pres-
ent effects of past discrimination may be continued or even
amplified by facially neutral policies that do not discriminate
purposely, but that perpetuate the consequences of previous,
often intentional discrimination. 15' Because the goal of CERD is
equality in practice, some commentators assert that facially neu-
tral policies or practices that have a disparate impact on some
racial groups should be amended, even without showing a dis-
criminatory purpose. 5
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Id.
148. Meron, supra note 23, at 289.
149. CERD, supra note 14, art. 1(4), at 216.
150. Id.
151. Id. art. 5, at 220-22.
152. Id.
153. See McKEAN, supra note 116, at 162 (noting that Article 5 clearly affirms prin-
ciple of "equality before the law").
154. See Meron, supra note 23, at 289 (stating, for example, that effect of unneces-
sarily stringent educational qualifications required for jobs can be to deny employment
to members of racial groups who were denied access to education previously).
155. See id. (acknowledging that prohibition against practices that have discrimina-
tory effect imposes greater burden on states than obligation to prohibit purposeful dis-
crimination); e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1977) (finding that
Congress intended Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and to remove barriers that previously operated to favor identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees). Under Tide VII, practices, pro-
cedures, or tests that are neutral on their face, and even neutral in intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices. Id.
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3. CERD Enforcement Mechanisms
CERD's enforcement mechanisms make State Parties ac-
countable for their policies on racial discrimination at the na-
tional and international levels.156 The committee created by
CERD 157 ("CERD Committee") to oversee the Convention's im-
plementation mandates State Parties to submit annual reports
describing their implementation of the treaty, which it then re-
views.' 5 8 The committee provides a state-to-state complaint
mechanism 159 as well as an optional individual complaint mecha-
nism.16 All disputes between State Parties that cannot be re-
solved through negotiation go before the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ").161
Article 6 requires State Parties to provide individuals in
their jurisdictions with effective protection and remedies against
acts of discrimination that violate rights under CERD. 62 Reme-
dies under Article 6 include the right to seek just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of
156. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 12: The
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://
www.unhchr.cr/html/menu6/2/fsl2/htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 12] (stating that because State Parties are accounta-
ble to international forum on racial discrimination, they have made changes in national
law to bring them into compliance with CERD).
157. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 8(1), at 224 (establishing committee consisting
of eighteen independent experts selected by State Parties, but serving in their personal
capacities).
158. See id. art. 9(1), at 224-26 (mandating annual reports by State Parties describ-
ing legislative, judicial, administrative, and other measures taken to give effect to CERD
provisions).
159. See id. art. 11(1), at 226 (explaining that State Party may inform CERD Com-
mittee if another State Party is "not giving effect to the provisions" of CERD).
160. See id. art. 14(1), at 230 (stating that State Parties have option to empower
CERD Committee to consider complaints from individuals within their jurisdictions
who claim to be victims of CERD violations).
161. See id. art. 22, at 236-38 (permitting disputes between State Parties on "the
application or interpretation" of CERD that cannot be settled by negotiation to be re-
ferred to ICJ at request of any party to dispute).
162. Id. art. 6, at 222. Article 6 of CERD states:
State Parties shall assure everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection
and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State insti-
tutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights
and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to
seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any
damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.
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discrimination. 163 Article 6 contemplates that national tribunals
and institutions will address rights under the Convention in or-
der to determine whether reparation for violations is war-
ranted. 1
6 4
Article 8(1) of CERD establishes the CERD Committee, 165
which oversees three procedures to monitor State Parties' fulfill-
ment of their obligations under CERD.' 66 Under Article 9's re-
porting procedure, State Parties agree to submit reports to the
CERD Committee every two years, with the first report due
within one year of a party's ratification. 167 The CERD Commit-
tee reviews the reports, determines whether State Parties have
implemented adequate legal protections for groups that have ex-
perienced racial discrimination, and examines evidence of de
facto discrimination. 168 The CERD Committee makes conclud-
ing observations about the reports and may make suggestions on
how the reporting states could improve their application of
CERD. 169 These suggestions are not legally binding.
17
163. Id.
164. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 24 (statement of
Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, Dep't of State) (explaining that Article 6 of CERD
includes right to seek reparation for any damage suffered from discrimination that vio-
lates human rights under Convention).
165. Id. art. 8(1), at 224.
166. See Fact Sheet No. 12, supra note 156 (describing reporting procedure, state-to-
state complaint procedure, and individual complaint procedure).
167. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 9(1), at 224-26 (describing report as consisting
of legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures adopted by State Party that
implement CERD). Commentators note that the annual reports required by Article 9
of CERD to be submitted to the CERD Committee provide an opportunity for U.S.
domestic civil rights organizations to address U.S. obligations under CERD. See McDou-
gall, supra note 38, at 594 (criticizing United States for not completing its first compli-
ance report as required by CERD Committee and urging domestic civil rights groups to
engage in dialogue with United States about their understanding of U.S. obligations
under CERD); Taifa, supra note 21, at 684-86 (noting that Human Rights Watch,
IHRLG, and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund provided suggestions for
U.S. report and urged it to address racial bias in death penalty cases by enacting legisla-
tion).
168. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 78 (statement of Min-
nesota Advocates for Human Rights and Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights)
[hereinafter Minnesota Human Rights Advocates] (noting that CERD Committee may
use information not provided by State Party in committee's report such as statistics
from non-governmental organizations)..
169. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 9(2), at 226 (stating that CERD Committee re-
ports annually to U.N. General Assembly on its activities and makes recommendations
based on examinations of reports).
170. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 78 (statement of Min-
nesota Human Rights Advocates) (noting that since 1969, CERD Committee has issued
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Under Article 11, a State Party may file a complaint with
the CERD Committee alleging that another State Party has failed
to fulfill its obligations under CERD. 17 Thus far, no state-to-
state complaints have been submitted to the CERD Committee
under this provision. 7 2 Under Article 14, a State Party has the
option of permitting the CERD Committee to receive petitions
from individuals or groups of individuals who claim to be victims
of violations of rights provided in CERD. 173 If the CERD Com-
mittee accepts the petition, then it will render a decision based
on all the information that it receives from the petitioner and
the State Party.174
C. U.S. Ratification of CERD
On June 24, 1994, the U.S. Senate authorized the United
States to ratify CERD.1 75 The ratification contained several con-
ditions, including three reservations, a declaration, and an un-
derstanding ("RUDs") .176 The package of RUDs ensured that
the CERD provisions that conflict with existing U.S. law or the
U.S. Constitution would not bind the United States. 177 Com-
general recommendations discussing portions of CERD and State Parties' obligations,
which provide authoritative interpretations of CERD).
171. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 11 (1), at 226 (explaining that CERD Committee
transmits complaint to offending state, which may reply with explanation or clarifica-
tion of situation).
172. See Fact Sheet No. 12, supra note 156 (noting that all State Parties to CERD
recognize competence of CERD Committee to receive and act on complaint by one
State Party that another State Party is not giving effect to CERD).
173. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 14, at 230 (explaining that State Party is in-
formed of communication and has three months to reply to CERD Committee with
explanation or with information on any remedial action that it has taken). Although
individual communications are confidential and the CERD Committee will not reveal
the petitioner's name to the State Party without petitioner's permission, the CERD
Committee will not receive anonymous petitions. Id. Thusfar, the CERD Committee
has received very few petitions because only eighteen State Parties have authorized the
Committee to consider individual complaints. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing,
supra note 18, at 79 (statement of Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights) (noting that
procedures for making individual complaints under CERD are not well-known in those
states).
174. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 14, at 230 (stating that CERD Committee pub-
lishes its decision and recommendations and State Party's observations in its annual
report).
175. CERD Ratication, supra note 13, at S7634.
176. Id.
177. See Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (noting that U.S. practice of ratifying human
rights treaties with reservations restricts their impact and nullifies their effect).
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mentators note that the Clinton Administration's assurance that
CERD would not have any domestic impact enabled CERD's rati-
fication by the more conservative U.S. senators on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee ("Foreign Relations Commit-
tee") .178
1. Conditions to U.S. Ratification of CERD
The Senate accepted the package of RUDs submitted by the
Clinton Administration. 179  The reservations limited CERD's
ability to restrict racist speech under Articles 4 and 7,180 pro-
tected private conduct from governmental interference,' 18 and
withheld the jurisdiction of the ICJ to resolve state-to-state dis-
putes where the United States is a party.'1 2 The understanding
noted that the federal government would apply the Convention
178. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 587 (noting that many questions asked by
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in discussing CERD dealt with whether ratification
would have any impact on domestic law); Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (noting that
United States attaches uniform set of reservations, understandings, and declarations
("RUDs") to all human rights treaties that it ratifies).
179. CERD Ratifcation, supra note 13, at S7634.
180. Id. The first reservation states:
[t]hat the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protec-
tions of individual freedom of speech, expression, and association. Accord-
ingly, the United States does not accept any obligations under this Conven-
tion, in particular under Articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights through the
adoption of legislation or any other measures to the extent they are protected
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Id.
181. Id. The second reservations states:
[t]hat the Constitution and laws of the United States establish extensive pro-
tections against discrimination, reaching significant areas of non-governmen-
tal activity. Individual privacy and freedom from governmental interference in
private conduct, however, are also recognized as among the fundamental val-
ues which shape our free and democratic society. The United States under-
stands that the identification of the rights protected under the Convention by
reference to Article 1 to fields of "public life" reflects a similar distinction be-
tween spheres of public conduct that are customarily the subject of govern-
ment regulation, and spheres of private conduct that are not. To the extent,
however, that the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private con-
duct, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention
to enact legislation or take other measures under paragraph (1) of Article 2,
subparagraphs (1) (c) and (d) of Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 with respect
to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.
Id.
182. Id. The third reservation states "[t]hat with reference to Article 22 of the
Convention, before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted
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only subject to the jurisdiction that it has over state and local
governments.1 8 3 The declaration stated that the United States
ratified CERD as a non-self-executing treaty."8 4
2. The Non-Self-Executing Declaration
Although Article VI of the U.S. Constitution 18 5 states that
treaties are the supreme law of the United States, 8 6 treaties that
are not self-executing a87 are not automatically considered do-
mestic law.a88 The United States ratified CERD with a declara-
to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific
consent of the United States is required." Id.
183. Id. The understanding states:
[t]hat the United States understands that this Convention shall be imple-
mented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction
over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local govern-
ments. To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropri-
ate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.
Id.
184. Id. The declaration states "[t]hat the United States declares that the provi-
sions of the Convention are not self-executing." Id. The ratification also included a
proviso stating that nothing in the Convention required or authorized legislation or
other action by the United States that was prohibited by the U.S. Constitution as inter-
preted by the United States. Id.
185. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that:
[ti his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
186. Id.
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 111, reporter's note 5
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD] (stating that distinction between self-execut-
ing and non-self-executing treaties arose from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1829)). In that case, Justice Marshall distinguished treaties that are directly applied by
the judiciary from treaties that require legislation before they can provide a rule of
decision for the judiciary. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 (finding that "when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legis-
lature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court").
188. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (explaining that "a self-executing" treaty does not require domestic legislation
to give it force of law in United States); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 187, § 111.3
(stating that "non-self-executing" treaty will not be recognized as law without imple-
menting legislation); Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Trea-
ties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 220-21 (stating that non-self-executing declara-
tions prevent U.S. courts from applying those treaties as domestic law). But see RESTATE-
MENT THIRD, supra note 187, reporter's note 5 (stating that when United States delays
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tion stating that it was not self-executing.189 By including the
non-self-executing declaration in its ratification of CERD, the
Clinton Administration intended that CERD would not create
any rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts through private
causes of action.1 90
The United States had previously ratified two other human
rights treaties with non-self-executing declarations'91-the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights19 2 ("ICCPR") in
1992193 and the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment194
("Torture Convention") in 1990.195 Commentators have widely
criticized the use of non-self-executing declarations in human
rights treaties as nullifying their effect.' 96 Yet some scholars note
that the non-self-executing declarations are necessary to enable
ratification of human rights treaties. 1 97
enacting legislation necessary to implement treaty, there is strong presumption that
treaty has been considered self-executing by Executive and Legislative Branches and
should be considered self-executing by courts); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82
AM.J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) (arguing that distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties is inconsistent with U.S. Constitution).
189. CERD Ratification, supra note 13, at S7634.
190. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Con-
rad K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State) (stating that U.S. law contains exten-
sive protections against racial discrimination, making new cause of action under CERD
unnecessary).
191. Id.
192. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
193. See 138 CONG. Rc. S4784 (1992) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (consenting to ratifi-
cation of ICCPR).
194. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
195. See 136 CONG. REc. S17486 (1990) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (consenting to
ratification of Torture Convention).
196. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 51 (statement of Wade
Henderson, Dir., Washington Bureau, NAACP) (claiming that non-self-executing dec-
laration "rob[s] [CERD] of its central value"); id. at 52 (statement of William T. Lake,
Member, Bd. of Dirs., IHRLG) (stating that qualifications such as non-self-executing
declaration give appearance that U.S. ratification of CERD is not legitimate); McDou-
gall, supra note 38, at 588 (stating that non-self-executing declaration denies U.S. citi-
zens important remedies for violations of CERD and deprives U.S. courts of opportu-
nity to interpret CERD); Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (asserting that non-self-executing
declaration restricts CERD's impact).
197. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 187 (noting that non-self-executing declaration was
strategically necessary to ensure ratification of CERD); Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (stat-
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II. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NON-SELF-EXECUTING
DECLARATION AND COMPARISON OF STANDARDS
FOR PROVING DISCRIMINATION UNDER
CERD AND U.S. LAW
The United States ratified CERD as a non-self-executing
treaty to ensure that CERD would not create a new cause of ac-
tion in U.S. courts.19 The United States justified the non-self-
executing declaration by claiming that U.S. law provides suffi-
cient protections and remedies against racial discrimination and
that no changes in domestic law were necessary to comply with
CERD.19 9 Criticisms of the non-self-executing declaration in-
clude arguments that it is legally unsound2°0 and that it nullifies
the impact of CERD. 21 1  Commentators assert that because U.S.
law requires a showing of discriminatory purpose in most cases,
it conflicts with the CERD definition of racial discrimination that
includes discriminatory effect.
20 2
ing that it appears politically imperative for United States to ratify human rights treaties
with extensive qualifications).
198. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 31 (statement of
Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that because U.S. law
provides extensive protections against racial discrimination, no new cause of action
would be necessary for United States to comply with CERD).
199. See id. at 13-14 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State) (stating that U.S. federal, state, and local laws already provide opportunities to
challenge allegedly discriminatory statutes and practices).
200. See Paust, supra note 188, at 760 (claiming that distinction between self-exe-
cuting and non-self-executing treaties is inconsistent with Article VI of U.S. Constitu-
tion); Charles H. Dearborn, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations that Treaty Provisions
Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L. REv. 233, 233-34 (1979) (arguing that non-self-execut-
ing declarations have no binding legal effect and should not be used in construing
treaties). See generally RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 187, reporter's note 5 (stating
that framers of U.S. Constitution envisioned self-executing treaties as enabling United
States to fulfill its international obligations).
201. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 51 (statement of Wade
Henderson, NAACP) (stating that non-self-executing declaration denies U.S. citizens
protections of international human rights law); id. at 53 (statement of William T. Lake,
IHRLG) (stating that non-self-executing declaration "hobbles [U.S.) ratification"); Mc-
Dougall, supra note 38, at 587 (noting that non-self-executing declaration demonstrates
that U.S. commitment to international human rights standards is insincere); Taifa,
supra note 21, at 650 (asserting that non-self-executing declaration invalidates CERD's
effect).
202. See Taifa, supra note 21, at 670 (noting that many issues of racial discrimina-
tion in U.S. criminal justice system may be violations of CERD provisions proscribing
laws and practices with racially discriminatory effect); Weaver & Purcell, supra note 21,
at 373 (stating that U.S. equal protection jurisprudence does not effectively address
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A. Arguments that the Non-Self-Executing Declaration Should
Preclude Application of CERD Standards for Proving
Discrimination in the United States
By ratifying CERD and other human rights treaties with
RUDs, the United States endeavors to eliminate any discrepan-
cies between the treaty and U.S. law. 2 3 The non-self-executing
declaration to CERD ensures that no new cause of action will be
available under the Convention.2 °4 Commentators note that the
declaration was necessary to ensure the Senate's consent for rati-
fication.2 °5 Because U.S. law provides extensive protections and
remedies against racial discrimination, the United States insisted
that it did not need to make changes to domestic law to comply
with CERD.206
1. Rationale for the Non-Self-Executing Declaration
The Clinton Administration believed that existing U.S. law
provided extensive protections and remedies against racial dis-
crimination to satisfy the requirements of CERD, making a new
cause of action unnecessary.2 °7 Through its RUDs to CERD, it
endeavored to eliminate any remaining discrepancies between
CERD and U.S. law.2 08 Because any claim made under CERD
would be sufficiently addressed by existing U.S. law, the non-self-
executing declaration merely ensures that no frivolous claims
race-neutral statutes and discretionary decisions that have racially disproportionate im-
pact).
203. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at II (statement of Con-
rad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that U.S. reservations, under-
standings, and declarations make U.S. obligations under CERD consistent with U.S.
law); Sloss, supra note 25, at 135 (explaining that U.S. executive branch encourages
U.S. Senate to approve ratification of human rights treaties by assuring Senate that it
has eliminated discrepancies between treaty obligations and U.S. law).
204. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Conrad
K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
205. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 174 (noting that non-self-executing declaration
serves to circumvent opposition from Senators who were hostile towards U.S. ratifica-
tion of human rights treaties).
206. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 1-2 (statement of Deval
Patrick, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
207. See id. at 13 (statement of Conrad K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State) (pointing out that federal, state, and local laws provide numerous opportunities
to challenge discriminatory statutes and other government action in U.S. courts).
208. See id. at 11 (explaining that reservations make U.S. obligations consistent
with U.S. law).
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can be brought under CERD. 20 9
One scholar has described the United States' ratification of
human rights treaties as an effort to reconcile two conflicting
policy objectives. 210 First, the United States aims to ensure that it
can comply with its treaty obligations.211 In defense of allega-
tions that it does not take its treaty obligations seriously,2 1 2 the
United States claims that the RUDs reflect a close examination
of U.S. law and practice to ensure that the United States will be
able to comply with its obligations.213 Second, the United States
seeks to prevent human rights treaties from altering domestic
law.2 14 Because CERD contains more protections against racial
discrimination than U.S. law,215 the United States adopted the
appropriate reservations to relieve itself of the obligation to sat-
isfy those requirements. 216 This practice resolves the conflict be-
tween the two competing objectives in ratifying human rights
treaties. 217
209. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 204 (noting that one purpose of non-self-executing
declarations was to ensure that litigants do not flood courts with frivolous treaty-based
human rights claims).
210. See id. at 172 (describing first objective as complying with treaty obligations
and second objective as preventing human rights treaties from affecting U.S. law).
211. See id. at 176 (noting that if United States did not intend to comply with
obligations under human rights treaties, it would ratify them with no reservations and
only adhere to those provisions that provided equivalent protections to U.S. law).
212. See id. at 177 (stating that human rights advocates criticize reservations that
United States attaches to its ratification of human rights treaties as demonstrating that
it handles its treaty obligations frivolously).
213. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Con-
rad K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (noting that RUDs reflect seriousness
with which United States accepts its obligations under CERD). The reservation to Arti-
cle 4 of CERD, for example, which requires State Parties to condemn propaganda based
on racial hatred or superiority, ensures that Article 4 could not effect changes in domes-
tic law that conflict with the First Amendment. Id. at 11-12. Since the U.S. Constitution
takes precedence over treaties, the reservation to Article 4 was essential to ratification of
CERD. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 180 (noting that Article 4 reservation ensured that
United States would not be in breach of obligations under CERD).
214. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 174 (stating that U.S. Senate has been historically
suspicious of efforts to use treaties to achieve domestic legal reforms).
215. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 584-86 (describing how State Parties' obliga-
tions under CERD to take affirmative action measures, to eliminate policies that perpet-
uate racial discrimination, and to regulate racist speech are broader than current U.S.
law permits).
216. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 11 (statement of Con-
rad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that U.S. reservations make
its obligations under CERD consistent with U.S. law).
217. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 177 (noting that United States ratified CERD,
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The latter goal of avoiding any domestic impact from
human rights treaties arose from Sen. John Bricker's attempt to
amend the U.S. Constitution ("Bricker Amendment") in the
1950s to render all treaties non-self-executing.218 In its effort to
defeat the proposed amendment, the Eisenhower Administra-
tion convinced the Senate that action by the Executive Branch to
restrain the domestic impact of human rights treaties would be
more effective than a constitutional amendment. 219 When Presi-
dentJimmy Carter submitted several human rights treaties to the
Senate in 1978, he felt it was politically necessary to assure the
Senate that the treaties would not be used to change domestic
law.2 2 ° One scholar notes that for the Executive Branch, the
main purpose of the non-self-executing declarations is to pre-
vent opposition to treaty ratifications by the Senate.2 2 1
Because the Clinton Administration wanted to obtain the
Senate's consent for ratification of CERD, it aimed to ensure
that there would be no conflicts between CERD and domestic
law.22 If the Administration indicated that changes to domestic
law would be necessary, then some members of the Senate would
have resisted ratification of CERD.223 On the other hand, if the
Administration decided not to ratify CERD, then it would have
met strong criticism from members of the Senate who favor U.S.
ratification of human rights treaties. 224 By endeavoring to elimi-
ICCPR, and Torture Convention with reservations to eliminate discrepancies treaties
and U.S. law).
218. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Sena-
tor Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). Sen. John Bricker, between 1950 and 1955,
proposed a constitutional amendment aimed at preventing civil rights forces from in-
voking international treaties to end racial segregation. See id. at 349 (stating that intent
of Bricker Amendment was to prevent human rights treaties from having any impact on
U.S. law). The Bricker Amendment would have rendered all treaties non-self-executing
and would have required the U.S. Congress to pass legislation in order implement a
treaty ratified by the Senate. See id. (noting that Bricker Amendment included the fol-
lowing provision: "A treaty shall become effective in the United States only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."). While those opposed to
civil rights for African-Americans supported the proposed amendment, President Eisen-
hower opposed it and it was ultimately defeated. Id. at 348-49.
219. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 174 (noting that after defeat of Bricker Amend-
ment, subsequent U.S. Administrations refrained from participating in human rights
treaties until Carter Administration).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 175.
222. Id. at 187.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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nate every discrepancy between the treaty and domestic law
through RUDs, the United States could fulfill its treaty obliga-
tions without having to change domestic law.225 If the Executive
Branch successfully eliminated all discrepancies between CERD
requirements and U.S. law through its RUDs, then the non-self-
executing declaration would have no legal relevance and would
merely reassure conservative senators that no changes to domes-
tic law could result from CERD. 22 16
2. Consistency of U.S. Civil Rights Law with CERD
U.S. law provides extensive protections and remedies
against racial discrimination.227 While the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution 228 requires a showing of discrimi-
natory purpose for courts to grant relief,229 several U.S. statutes
permit a showing of discriminatory impact in the absence of dis-
criminatory purpose.23 ° Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor for
the U.S. Department of State, testified before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee that U.S. law complies with Article 2(1) (c) of
CERD,23 1 which requires State Parties to rectify any laws that
225. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Con-
rad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that by specifying its limita-
tions to CERD, United States meets its obligations under CERD while remaining consis-
tent with its constitution and laws).
226. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 188 (noting that under this analysis, non-self-exe-
cuting declaration would be merely "window dressing").
227. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Con-
rad K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that U.S. law also provides
numerous opportunities for individuals to challenge discriminatory statutes and other
government action).
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state may "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
229. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) (holding that defendant who
alleges equal protection violation must demonstrate purposeful discrimination).
230. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (1) (a) (i) (1994). This section
states that:
[a]n unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
... if... a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity.
Id.; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (stating that violation of
act is established if "it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State are not equally open to participation by members of a class").
231. CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218.
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have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimina-
tion.23 2 Based on this analysis, the United States did not make a
reservation to Article 2(1) (c). 233
Under federal statutes such as the Voting Rights Act of
1965,234 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23' and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968,236 courts may nullify practices that have a
discriminatory effect. 237 In the absence of showing intentional
racial discrimination, plaintiffs, under those statutes, may make
out a prima facie case of discrimination if they show that a race-
neutral practice causes statistically significant racial disparities.238
If the plaintiff meets the prima facie standard, the burden of
proof then shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's argu-
ment and to justify the practice by demonstrating its necessity.239
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the
equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments as prohibiting only purposeful discrimination.24 ° Courts,
nonetheless, may consider evidence of disparate impact as a fac-
tor in determining whether there is purposeful discrimina-
232. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 19 (prepared statement of
Conrad K Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
233. See id. (pointing out that CERD provisions relating to discriminatory purpose
and effect warranted Senate's attention, but should not be included in U.S. package of
reservations).
234. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73c (1994) (prohibiting prac-
tices that result in denial of right to vote on account of race).
235. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (a) (i) (1994) (prohibit-
ing private employment practices having discriminatory effect).
236. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1994) (prohibiting prac-
tices that result in discrimination in sale or rental of housing).
237. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (stating that violation of Voting
Rights Act of 1965 could be proven by demonstrating discriminatory effect of voting
district plan); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that educational
requirements and standardized intelligence test for employment that disqualified
blacks at higher proportion than whites and that was not significantly related to success-
ful job performance violated Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); R. SCHWEMM, Hous-
ING DISCIMINATION LAw AND LITIGATION § 10.04 (1990) (noting that although U.S.
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, lower courts have consistently held that
disparate impact claims may be brought under Fair Housing Act of 1968, without show-
ing discriminatory intent).
238. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 33 (prepared statement of
Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State).
239. Id. at 33-34.
240. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (finding that while Title
VII permits challenges to employment practices that disproportionately affect blacks
without showing discrimination, alleging violation of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments
of U.S. Constitution requires showing discriminatory purpose).
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tion. Where racial disparities arising from a race-neutral prac-
tice are especially stark and where there is no legitimate justifica-
tion for the disparity, discriminatory intent may be inferred.242
Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of State,
suggested that in most cases, disparate impact alone is not deter-
minative and courts will analyze statistical disparities along with
other evidence that may be probative of discriminatory pur-
pose.243 If the totality of the evidence suggests that discrimina-
tory purpose underpins the race-neutral practice, then the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to justify the practice.2 4 4
Harper asserted that Article 2(1) (c) of CERD did not re-
quire the automatic invalidation of race-neutral laws, regula-
tions, or practices that disproportionately impacted some racial
groups. 245  He cited the CERD Committee's General Recom-
mendation 14,246 which states that in determining whether an
action has an effect that violates CERD, the CERD Committee
will examine whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate
impact on a particular racial group.2 47 Harper interpreted the
CERD Committee's term "unjustifiable disparate impact" to
mean that CERD only addressed those race-neutral practices
241. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (finding that disparate impact "may provide an important starting
point" for determining whether discriminatory purpose exists).
242. See id. (noting that cases where "a clear pattern [of discrimination], unex-
plainable on grounds other than race emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing action is neutral on its face" are rare). Absent such a clear show-
ing, discriminatory effect alone is not determinative. Id.
243. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 33-34 (statement of
Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 266).
244. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (finding that when defend-
ant shows "substantial underrepresentation of his group" in jury selection, he has made
prima facie case of discrimination, and burden shifts to state to rebut claim).
245. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 19 (statement of Conrad
K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
246. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Definition of Discrimination
(Article 1, para. 1) General Recommendation 14 (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> [hereinafter CERD Committee General Recommendation 14]
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that differential treatment is
not considered discrimination if criteria are legitimate within objectives of CERD or fall
within Article 1(4)).
247. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 19 (statement of Con-
rad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (citing CERD Committee General
Recommendation 14 as supporting United States' interpretation of Article 2(1) (c) of
CERD as only invalidating those race-neutral laws that have unjustifiable disparate im-
pact).
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that create statistically significant racial disparities that are un-
necessary.248 He concluded that the CERD Committee's view
was consistent with proving violations under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and federal civil rights statutes.2 49
B. Arguments that the Non-Self-Executing Declaration Should Not
Preclude Application of ClRD Standards for Proving
Discrimination in the United States
The United States' view that the non-self-executing declara-
tion precludes U.S. citizens from invoking CERD's protections in
U.S. courts and shields U.S. law from adapting to CERD has
been widely challenged. 250  Noting the divergence between
CERD standards for proving discrimination and U.S. law, 251
many commentators lament that the non-self-executing declara-
tion makes CERD inapplicable in the United States.2 52 Because
CERD's definition of racial discrimination includes practices
that have a discriminatory effect, 253 some authors assert that U.S.
law, which generally requires a showing of discriminatory pur-
pose,25 4 conflicts with CERD.25 5
248. Id.; see id. at 33-34 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't
of State) (explaining that this reading of Article 2(1) (c) is consistent with litigation of
claims under Titles VI and VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Fair Housing Act of
1968). Mr. Talbott also noted that the CERD Committee's analysis was compatible with
equal protection claims to the extent that statistical proof of racial disparity, especially
when considered with other circumstantial evidence, was probative oP the discrimina-
tory intent necessary to make a claim under those provisions, shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant to justify a race-neutral practice. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 51 (statement of Wade
Henderson, NAACP) (stating the non-self-executing declaration denies U.S. citizens
protection of human rights law); id. at 52 (statement of William T. Lake, IHRLG) (criti-
cizing non-self-executing declaration as United States' refusal to let its own citizens en-
force rights in U.S. courts);
251. McDougall, supra note 38, at 584; Taifa, supra note 21, at 670.
252. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 588 (noting that non-self-executing declara-
tion was most troubling aspect of U.S. ratification of CERD because it prohibits private
causes of action by U.S. citizens); Taifa, supra note 21, at 650 (stating that non-self-
executing declaration nullifies effect of CERD).
253. CERD, supra note 14, art. 1(1), at 216.
254. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 382
U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
255. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 584-86 (pointing out that CERD's require-
ment that State Parties rectify state practices that have discriminatory effect may reach
beyond current Fourteenth Amendment protections); Taifa, supra note 21, at 670 (not-
ing that issues of discrimination in U.S. criminal justice system may violate CERD provi-
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1. Challenges to the Non-Self-Executing Declaration
Many commentators oppose the non-self-executing declara-
tion on legal256 and policy grounds.2 57 First, some scholars note
that non-self-executing declarations are inconsistent with Article
VI of the U.S. Constitution, which states that treaties are the
supreme law of the land.258 Second, commentators argue that
the non-self-executing declaration nullifies the effect of CERD in
the United States by preventing U.S. citizens from causes of ac-
tion under the Convention. 259 Third, some authors note that
the non-self-executing declaration only prohibits private causes
of action, but does not prevent CERD from being invoked as a
defense to criminal charges or under other federal statutes.260
Despite the U.S. government's practice of ratifying human
rights treaties as non-self-executing, many scholars presume that
treaties are generally self-executing. 261 One scholar notes that
the U.S. Constitution does not specify that treaties must be self-
executing in order to be the supreme law of the United States.26 2
The Reporter's Note of Section 111 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law2 63 states that the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution contemplated that treaties were to be self-executing
sions that proscribe laws and practices with racially discriminatory impact, regardless of
intent).
256. See Paust, supra note 188, at 760 (claiming that non-self-executing declara-
tions are inconsistent with Article VI of U.S. Constitution, which states that treaties are
supreme law.of land); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 187, § 111, reporter's note 5
(stating intention of framers of U.S. Constitution that treaties are self-executing).
257. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 51 (statement of Wade
Henderson, NAACP) (asserting that non-self-executing declaration impairs CERD's im-
pact in United States); Taifa, supra note 21, at 655 (opining that non-self-executing
declaration permits United States to "opt out" of CERD).
258. Paust, supra note 188, at 760; see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 187, § 111,
reporter's note 5 (noting that there is strong presumption that treaties are self-execut-
ing where Executive Branch does not request implementing legislation).
259. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 51 (statement of Wade
Henderson, NAACP); Taifa, supra note 21, at 655.
260. See Paust, supra note 188, at 781-82 (stating that non-self-executing treaties
can affect domestic law indirectly and aid in interpreting constitutional, statutory, or
common law provisions); Sloss, supra note 25, at 152 (asserting that U.S. courts can
apply non-self-executing treaties directly even if those treaties do not create private
causes of action); Vazquez, supra note 25, at 1143 (stating that right of action under
treaty is not necessary if treaty is invoked as defense).
261. LiLLicH & HANNUM, supra note 128, at 120.
262. See Paust, supra note 188, at 766 (stating that by its express terms, U.S. Consti-
tution states that treaties have self-executing status).
263. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 187, § 111, reporter's note 5.
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in order to avoid delay in carrying out the obligations of the
United States.264
William T. Lake of the International Human Rights Law
Group2 65 testified before the Foreign Relations Committee that
the non-self executing declaration did not absolve the United
States of its duty under international law to ensure that domestic
courts comply with CERD, but only sought to deny the courts a
role in that capacity. 266 One commentator noted that the decla-
ration has prevented the U.S. judiciary from interpreting the
provisions of CERD, depriving the international community
from potentially valuable contributions to international jurispru-
dence on the application of CERD.26 7 U.S. federal courts have
consistently rejected claims made under the U.N. Charter, the
ICCPR, and the Torture Convention, noting that those treaties
were ratified as non-self-executing.268 In the only published U.S.
264. See id. (noting intent of framers of U.S. Constitution to avoid obtaining Sen-
ate's approval for second time for implementing legislation after obtaining Senate's
consent for ratification).
265. See International Human Rights Law Group (visited May 15, 1999) <http://
www.hrlawgroup.org/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that
IHRLG is non-profit organization of human rights and legal professionals involved in
human rights advocacy, litigation, and training internationally).
266. See id. at 54 (prepared statement of William T. Lake, IHRLG) (asserting that
U.S. judiciary, rather than executive branch has power to decide which provisions of
CERD are self-executing and that any declaration regarding self-executing status would
be merely legislative history and would not overcome language of treaty). In addition,
because the non-self-executing provision to CERD is in the form of a declaration, rather
than a reservation, some commentators have questioned whether it has any legal signifi-
cance. McDougall, supra note 38 at 590. A declaration is generally understood as a
statement giving notice of basic principles or policies, while a reservation is a formal
derogation from obligations under the treaty. JoaN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAw AS
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 366 (1996).
267. McDougall, supra note 38, at 588. One author notes that international tribu-
nals examining discrimination have referred to U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment as supplemental sources of authority. McKEAN, supra
note 116, at 228.
268. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (finding that
prisoners alleging non-consensual medical experimentation had no claim under ICCPR
or Convention Against Torture); Weir v. Broadnax, 1990 WL 195841, *7 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (rejecting claim under Articles 55 and 56 of U.N. Charter for relief from racially
discriminatory employment practices). In Sei Fujii v. State, a California appellate court
addressed the domestic application of the Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, which
mandate protection of human rights, and held that the California Alien Land Law,
which discriminated against people of Asian origin, was unenforceable because it vio-
lated the U.N. Charter. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). The court found
that since the U.N. Charter was a treaty, it superceded inconsistent state legislation. Id.
at 621. The California Supreme Court reversed that decision and ruled that the human
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court opinion that mentioned CERD, a California federal district
court rejected the plaintiffs constitutional challenge to a statute
replacing public school bilingual education with English immer-
sion education, but did not address the ramifications of the non-
self-executing declaration. 269  Some U.S. courts have implied,
however, that it is for the courts to decide whether a treaty is self-
executing where plaintiffs make claims under treaties that the
United States ratified as non-self-executing.2 7 0
Most of the criticisms of the non-self-executing declaration
focused on the declaration's effect on the United States's obliga-
tions under CERD. 27 1 Amnesty International USA272 testified
rights provisions in the U.N. Charter were non-self-executing and could not supercede
state law without congressional legislation. Id. Since this ruling was not appealed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed whether the human rights provisions of the
U.N. Charter are non-self-executing. Taifa, supra note 21, at 651 n.43.
269. See Valeria v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 1007, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting claim
made by amicus curiae brief that statute violated CERD and ICCPR as "not properly
within the scope of this action" because plaintiffs had not raised those claims).
270. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 831 (1979) (stating that "question of whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter
of interpretation for the courts when the issue presents itself in litigation"). But see
People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988)
(finding that treaties, international declarations, and charters had no effect on domes-
tic law unless they were self-executing or implemented by Congress). One commenta-
tor noted the possibility that jurisdiction will ultimately fall to U.S. courts to determine
the validity of the Administration's declaration that U.S. ratification of CERD does not
create a cause of action without implementing legislation. Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing, supra note 18, at 54 (statement of William T. Lake, IHRLG).
271. See id. at 51 (statement of Wade Henderson, NAACP) (stating that non-self-
executing reservation denies U.S. citizens protection of crucial human rights law); id. at
62 (prepared statement of ACLU) (noting that CERD's protections should be enforcea-
ble in U.S. courts). Most commentators supported the U.S. reservation on freedom of
speech. Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 62 (prepared statement of
ACLU); id. at 55 (prepared statement of William T. Lake, IHRLG). Many opposed the
U.S. reservation from the jurisdiction of the ICJ. See id. at 54 (prepared statement of
William T. Lake, IHRLG) (stating that ICJ plays crucial role in international disputes).
Lake noted that the United States need not fear frivolous claims through the ICJ for
two reasons: one, the interstate provision of CERD had never been used, and two,
frivolous cases would be dismissed at earlier stages of that procedure. Id. The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights stated that the ICJ reservation was particularly unjustifi-
able given that when the United States ratified the ICCPR, it submitted to the jurisdic-
tion of the Human Rights Committee, an international dispute resolution body. Id. at
72 (prepared statement of Lawyers Committee for Human Rights). It also noted that
the United States is already a party to over 75 treaties that provide for submission of
disputes to the ICJ and had no reason to doubt that it would render a fair and impartial
verdict. Id.
272. Amnesty International USA (visited May 15, 1999) <http://www.amnesty-
usa.org/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Amnesty International
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before the Foreign Relations Committee that while ratifying
CERD signaled that the United States was committed to elimi-
nating all traces of racial discrimination from its law and prac-
tice, the non-self-executing declaration indicated that the
United States would not provide its citizens with all available
means to challenge discriminatory practices in U.S. courts.2 7 3
Noting that the United States attached a similar package of
RUDs to the ratification of the ICCPR and the Torture Conven-
tion, one author commented that the United States merely in-
tended a symbolic commitment to international human rights
standards, while essentially maintaining the U.S. practice of iso-
lating itself from international scrutiny. 274 Prof. Louis Henkin
notes that the current U.S. practice of attaching non-self-execut-
ing declarations to human rights treaties that it ratifies accom-
plishes the goal of the Bricker Amendment, which was to nullify
the effect of international human rights standards in U.S. law.
2 75
Some commentators note, however, that while a non-self-
executing treaty may preclude private causes of action, the treaty
may still be applied directly by the courts. 2 7 6 A private cause of
action is not necessary if the treaty is being invoked as a defense
to criminal or civil charges brought by the government or pursu-
ant to another cause of action 2 77 such as Section 1983 of Chapter
42 of the United States Code278 ("Section 1983") or by means of
USA is the U.S. section of Amnesty International, a grassroots organization dedicated to
freeing prisoners of conscience, to gaining fair trials for political prisoners, to ending
torture, and to abolishing' the death penalty worldwide. Id.
273. Foreign Relations Committee Heaing, supra note 18, at 65 (prepared statement of
Amnesty International USA).
274. Taifa, supra note 21, at 649-50.
275. Henkin, supra note 218, at 348.
276. Sloss, supra note 25, at 151.
277. See Sloss, supra note 25, at 216 (noting that plaintiffs could raise treaty-based
claims by relying on federal, state, or common law to establish private cause of action);
Vazquez, supra note 25, at 1143-44 (stating that defendant who is prosecuted or sued
under state law or prior federal law that is inconsistent with non-self-executing treaty
may invoke that treaty to supersede inconsistent law without having to show that treaty
creates private right of action).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
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a writ of habeas Corpus.279 To interpret the non-self-executing
declaration as prohibiting all claims deriving from CERD even if
they are based on a domestic statutory relief provision would vio-
late the obligation of the United States under Article 6 of CERD
to provide a hearing before a competent national tribunal to an
aggrieved individual. 280  Despite the best efforts of the Clinton
Administration to eliminate all discrepancies between CERD re-
quirements and existing U.S. law, individuals might still be able
to raise legitimate claims under the treaty.281 In these cases, the
non-self-executing declaration should not prevent judges from
reaching the merits of these claims. 28 2 One scholar suggests that
in each case, courts balance the need to give effect to the non-
self-executing declaration against the need to promote compli-
ance with U.S. treaty obligations.283
2. Non-Self-Executing Declaration as Violating CERD's Object
and Purpose
By codifying the concept of equality between all races, 28 4
CERD's primary object is to extend protections against racial dis-
crimination to all citizens in its State Parties.285 Article 20(2) of
CERD286 specifically prohibits reservations that are incompatible
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1994) (providing that writ of habeas corpus extends
to prisoners who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States").
280. See generally Sloss, supra note 25, at 197 (stating that courts' refusal to reach
merits of all claims raised under non-self-executing treaties would conflict with U.S.
obligation to ensure aggrieved citizens hearing before impartial tribunal).
281. See id. at 219 (noting that Executive Branch mistakenly assured Senate during
ratification of CERD, ICCPR, and Torture Convention that non-self-executing declara-
tions were consistent with U.S. law and arguing that Executive Branch should now ac-
knowledge that certain discrepancies remain, making those declarations inconsistent
with U.S. treaty obligations).
282. See id. at 219-20 (noting that Executive Branch has primary responsibility for
ensuring U.S. compliance with treaty obligations).
283. See id. at 217 (recommending that U.S. Executive Branch submit amicus curiae
brief in support of plaintiff who claims human rights treaty violation and noting that
courts are likely to give great weight to views of Executive Branch).
284. See Egon Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 1057 (1966) (stating that CERD codi-
fies idea of equality among races in treaty form).
285. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 588-89 (noting that non-self-executing decla-
ration may violate CERD's object and purpose).
286. CERD, supra note 14, art 20(2), at 236. Article 20(2) of CERD states that:
[a] reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention
shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit
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with its object and purpose.287 One author notes that the United
States' non-self-executing declaration violates CERD's object and
purpose because it limits the extension of rights under CERD to
U.S. citizens.288 In 1994, the Human Rights Committee, which
administers the ICCPR, issued General Comment 24, a state-
ment asserting that broad reservations to the ICCPR, particularly
those that limit its applicability to the extent of protections pro-
vided by domestic law, violate the object and purpose of the
ICCPR.289 Although the Human Rights Committee's statement
refers specifically to the ICCPR, it has been noted that it could
apply equally well to CERD. 2
90
General Comment 24 addressed the Human Rights Com-
mittee's concern that broad, sweeping reservations essentially ab-
rogate treaty provisions that require any change to national
law.291 Such reservations, it noted, establish that the State Party
has accepted no international obligations.292 It stated that reser-
vations to human rights treaties must be specific and distinct.
2 93
The Human Rights Committee further noted that declarations
must not pronounce ICCPR obligations identical, or to be ac-
cepted only in so far as they are identical, with existing provi-
the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed.
A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two-
thirds of the State Parties to this Convention object to it.
Id.
287. Id. Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits reser-
vations that violate a treaty's object and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 337 [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion].
288. McDougall, supra note 38, at 588-89.
289. See General Comment No. 24 (52) of 2 November 1994 on Issues Relating to Reserva-
tions Made upon or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 19
(1994), reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 464, 467 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24]
(stating that Human Rights Committee views overly broad reservations as incompatible
with object and purpose of ICCPR).
290. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 589 (finding that Human Rights Commit-
tee's General Comment 24 that addresses permissibility of reservations to ICCPR may
be applicable to CERD).
291. See General Comment 24, supra note 289, 19 (stating that reservations must
refer to specific provision of ICCPR and indicate its scope in precise terms).
292. See id. (noting that reservations that seek to limit obligations to those cur-
rently existing in domestic law undermine attainment of international human rights
standards).
293. See id. (explaining that reservations or declarations should not seek to alter
meaning of ICCPR obligations by proclaiming identical to domestic law).
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sions of domestic law.294 Where the Human Rights Committee
finds that a reservation is incompatible with the object and pur-
pose of the ICCPR, the reservation will be severed, requiring the
reserving party to fulfill its obligations under the treaty without
the benefit of the reservation. 295 Under this analysis, one author
notes that the non-self-executing declaration to CERD should be
severed from the U.S. ratification.296
3. Inconsistency of U.S. Standards for Proving Discrimination
with CERD Standards in the Criminal Justice Context
Commentators note that CERD provides more protections
against discriminatory impact of race-neutral laws and practices
than is currently available under U.S. law.29 7 In the criminal jus-
tice context, U.S. courts have found that a showing of discrimi-
natory purpose is required to make a claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 29  CERD, in contrast, mandates State Parties to
consider whether the effect of its laws or practices is discrimina-
tory,299 and specifically extends this obligation to the criminal
justice context.3 °0
Although under U.S. law discriminatory effect alone gener-
ally cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation,0 the U.S.
294. See id. (stating that states should not seek to determine meaning of ICCPR
provision by attaching interpretive reservations or declarations).
295. Id. The United States expressed concern over General Comment 24, assert-
ing that the Human Rights Committee lacks the authority to issue to binding interpreta-
tions. See Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on
General Comment 24 (52) Relating to Reservations, 16 HUM. RTs. LJ. 422, 423 (1995) (stat-
ing U.S. position that reservations are integral part of its consent to be bound by ICCPR
and are not severable).
296. McDougall, supra note 38, at 589.
297. See Taifa, supra note 21, at 670 (noting that many issues of racial discrimina-
tion in U.S. criminal justice system may violate CERD provisions that prohibit laws and
practices having discriminatory effect); Weaver & Purcell, supra note 21, at 373 (stating
that CERD addresses discriminatory effect of race-neutral statutes and discretionary de-
cisions not recognized under U.S. equal protection analysis).
298. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967), (stating that burden is on petitioners to prove purposeful dis-
crimination to claim relief under Equal Protection Clause).
299. CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218.
300. Id. art. 5(a), at 220.
301. See McDougall, supra note 38, at 585 (noting that Article 2(1) (c) of CERD
extends beyond Fourteenth Amendment, which requires showing discriminatory pur-
pose); Meron, supra note 23, at 289 (stating that while U.S. law accounts for discrimina-
tory effect in determining discriminatory purpose, CERD prohibits discriminatory effect
independently of intent).
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Supreme Court has recognized certain situations where a show-
ing of discriminatory impact is sufficient to prove discriminatory
intent.30 2 Examples of relief being granted for discriminatory ef-
fect without showing a discriminatory purpose include situations
involving prosecutors' peremptory challenges to black jurors,30 3
voting rights, 30 4 and employment discrimination." 5 In those
contexts, once a complainant makes a primafacie case of discrim-
ination, the burden of proof shifts to the government, which has
the opportunity to rebut the allegation.3 0 6 The court then evalu-
ates whether the complainant has demonstrated discrimination
in light of the government's evidence.30 7
Criminal defendants, however, have been required to
demonstrate discriminatory purpose when claiming relief from
302. See Batson v: Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (finding that "'total or seri-
ously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires' . . . 'is itself such an
unequal application of the law. . . as to show intentional discrimination'") (quoting
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976)); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (holding that "a clear pattern, unex-
plainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (accepting statistical evidence of discriminatory impact as
proof of violations of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
303. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (holding that prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to strike jurors of the defendant's race may raise inference of purposeful dis-
crimination).
304. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (finding violation of Voting
Rights Act based on discriminatory effect of redistricting plan on black electoral repre-
sentation).
305. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (finding that statistical evi-
dence of race-based salary discrimination acceptable for claim of discrimination by pre-
ponderance of evidence under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
306. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (stating that once defendant makes primafacie case,
burden shifts to state to demonstrate neutral explanation for challenging black jurors);
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 398 (noting that if defendants in employment discrimination case
respond to plaintiffs' case by offering their own evidence, factfinder must decide
whether plaintiffs have demonstrated discrimination); Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77 (find-
ing that state defeated claim of discrimination with respect to one voting district where
it produced evidence of black electoral success). The state did not produce such evi-
dence in the other voting districts considered in that case and for those districts, the
Court upheld the District Court's finding that the redistricting plan caused black voters
to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice. Id. at
80; see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-98 (1977) (finding that prisoner's show-
ing of intentional discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury selection
shifted burden to state to dispel inference of intentional discrimination).
307. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (stating that after government has rebutted
allegation of discrimination, trial court will then determine whether defendant has es-
tablished purposeful discrimination).
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racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 3°" The
Court in McClesky expressed concern that by accepting the
Baldus Study as proof of discrimination by showing a pattern of
discriminatory effect in death penalty cases, the state would not
have an effective opportunity to rebut that allegation because it
would have to explain the decisions of the numerous prosecu-
tors in those cases.3 °9 The Court held that a prosecutor only has
to explain his decisions if the criminal defendant demonstrated
a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to his particular
case.
3 10
Commentators note that racial discrimination in the U.S.
criminal justice system persists as a result of the discriminatory
effect of discretionary decisions by prosecutors and of race-neu-
tral statutes.31 ' Article 5 of CERD requires State Parties to fulfill
their obligations under Article 2 in the criminal justice con-
text.3 12 In particular, Article 5(a) requires the right to equal
treatment before tribunals and all other organs administering
308. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 550 (1967)) (stating that defendant alleging equal protection violation must
prove purposeful discrimination).
309. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 296-97 nn. 17-18 (finding that state would have no
practical opportunity to rebut Baldus Study since it would be required to explain deci-
sions not only in that particular case, but also in past cases involving many different
prosecutors). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that if the Court followed the
framework set out in Castaneda, the state would have an opportunity to explain that
legitimate neutral criteria produced the racially disproportionate result. See id. at 359
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that without evidence to the contrary, McClesky's
evidence demonstrated that racial factors entered into decision that resulted in his
death sentence).
310. See id, at 297 n.18 (stating that "'[i]f the prosecutor could be made to answer
in court each time.., a person accused him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention
would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing criminal the criminal law'")
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976)).
311. See Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 18, at 65 (statement of Am-
nesty International USA) (stating that laws and policy of non-discrimination are not
executed or implemented to eliminate racial influences). Amnesty International USA
testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that race was a factor in
the denial of rights in the United States, particularly with respect to the death penalty
and police brutality. Id.; see Taifa, supra note 21, at 664-65 (noting that U.S. federal
sentencing guidelines for drug-related crimes impose longer sentences for crack co-
caine offenses than for powder cocaine offenses and disproportionately affect blacks,
who are more likely to be convicted of cocaine offenses). Taifa also notes that prosecu-
tors are more likely to grant downward departures from the sentencing guidelines for
powder cocaine offenses than for crack cocaine offenses. Id. at 665. These are discre-
tionary decisions that disproportionately affect blacks.' Id. at 669.
312. CERD supra note 14, art. 5, at 220-22.
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justice."'3 Authors assert that Article 5(a) of CERD would apply
to discretionary decisions made in the criminal justice context
that have a disproportionate racial impact.314
Article 2 (1) (c) of CERD would affect disparate racial impact
that results from race-neutral statutes.315 Authors note that
CERD provisions recognizing discriminatory effect would avoid
current obstacles of the equal protection analysis in the criminal
justice context.316 To prevail on an equal protection claim in the
case of discriminatory sentencing for crack cocaine as compared
with powder cocaine, for example, the complainant would have
to show that the statute was enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose, irrespective of the fact that ninety percent of the defend-
ants convicted under federal crack statutes are African-Ameri-
can.3" 7 Under Article 2 of CERD, such a showing of disparate
impact would be sufficient to obligate the United States to
change its laws.3 18
III. CERD CAN PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR CLAIMS OF RACIAL
DISPARITY IN U.S. DEATH PENALTY CASES
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision to uphold Warren Mc-
Clesky's death sentence, 319 despite clear evidence that the death
penalty disproportionately affects black defendants convicted of
killing whites,3 2' demonstrates that U.S. law does not adequately
protect against race influencing death penalty cases. 32' Because
many U.S. states and the U.S. government are expanding ,the
number of crimes for which the death penalty is available, 322 it is
urgent that efforts be made to address this problem. U.S. ratifi-
313. Id. art. 5(a), at 220.
314. Id.; see Taifa, supra note 21, at 670 (noting that selective infliction of police
brutality as example of discriminatory impact that could be alleviated by CERD).
315. Taifa, supra note 21, at 670; Weaver & Purcell, supra note 21, at 373.
316. Weaver & Purcell, supra note 21, at 373.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (examining U.S. Supreme
Court's decision to uphold McClesky's death sentence).
320. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing GAO Report and
Special Rapporteur's findings that race influences imposition of death penalty).
321. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting Special Rapporteur's find-
ing that McClesky decision placed heavy burden on petitioners claiming racial discrimi-
nation in death penalty).
322. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (illustrating that more U.S. states
have legalized death penalty and that number of executions is increasing).
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cation of CERD in 1994 after three decades of inaction signifies
a step towards U.S. recognition of international standards for
eradicating racial discrimination. CERD provides State Parties
with a comprehensive set of international standards and mecha-
nisms to address racial discrimination. 23 Because CERD recog-
nizes discrimination that results from race-neutral statutes that
disproportionately impact certain races, 24 it could be a powerful
tool for addressing racial disparity in imposition of the death
penalty in the United States. Unfortunately, the United States
qualified its ratification with a non-self-executing declaration,
which was intended to preclude U.S. citizens from bringing pri-
vate causes of action under CERD and to shield the United
States from complying with CERD.125 The non-self-executing
declaration's prohibition on private causes of action, however,
does not preclude CERD-based claims that raise the Convention
as a defense to criminal charges.3 26 Non-governmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs") that address CERD and racial disparity in death
penalty cases should raise CERD as a defense in U.S. federal
courts on behalf of death row inmates similarly situated to War-
ren McClesky on the grounds that the death penalty is applied in
a racially discriminatory manner. In the international arena,
State Parties should use CERD's enforcement mechanisms 327 to
condemn the non-self-executing declaration as violating CERD's
object and purpose and to file a complaint against the United
States alleging that the McClesky decision violates CERD.
A. The Non-Self-Executing Declaration Does Not Preclude U.S. Courts
from Addressing CERD
The non-self-executing declaration to CERD has been
323. See supra notes 132-74 and accompanying text (describing CERD provisions
and enforcement mechanisms requiring State Parties to eliminate discrimination).
324. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text (discussing CERD provisions
that prohibit laws and practices that have discriminatory effect).
325. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. position that
non-self-executing declaration precludes private causes of action under CERD).
326. See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (examining arguments that
non-self-executing declaration does not preclude treaty-based claims invoked as defense
or through other domestic relief provision).
327. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (describing CERD's enforce-
ment mechanisms that enable State Parties to object to reservations and to file inter-
state complaints).
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widely criticized. 28 Criticisms include arguments that it contra-
venes Article VI of the U.S. Constitution,3 29 that it nullifies
CERD's effect, 3 that by only precluding private causes of action
it does not prevent U.S. courts from addressing CERD-based
claims made as a defense to criminal charges, 331 and that it is
incompatible with the object and purpose of CERD. 3 2 While all
four of these arguments make important contributions to the
extensive scholarship criticizing U.S. ratification of human rights
treaties, the first two have little likelihood affecting change in
this practice.
Given that the United States has already ratified three major
human rights treaties with non-self-executing declarations, argu-
ments that the practice violates the U.S. Constitution are not
likely to sway decisionmakers. In addition, arguments that non-
self-executing declarations nullify the effect of CERD do not cre-
ate legal avenues to challenge that conventional wisdom. The
third and fourth arguments, however, provide legal avenues to
challenge the non-self-executing declaration. The argument
that the non-self-executing declaration, by only precluding pri-
vate causes of action, does not prevent criminal defendants from
raising CERD as a defense, opens the door for a McClesky-type
death row inmate with evidence as comprehensive as the Baldus
Study to raise a claim under CERD in U.S. courts. The argu-
ment that the declaration is incompatible with the object and
purpose of CERD paves the way for other State Parties to use
CERD enforcement mechanisms such as the CERD Committee
to object to the United States' non-self-executing declaration.
The United States' intended the non-self-executing declara-
tion to CERD to preclude private causes of action under
CERD. 333 Although many U.S. courts have been unwilling to
328. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (noting various arguments op-
posing non-self-executing declaration as preventing CERD's application in United
States).
329. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (mentioning argument that non-
self-executing declaration is inconsistent with Article VI of U.S. Constitution).
330. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text (discussing commentators'
views that non-self-executing declaration restricts impact of CERD in United States).
331. See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (explaining arguments that
non-self-executing declaration does not prohibit treaty-based claims that invoke treaty
as defense or under domestic relief provision).
332. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (noting commentator's argument
that non-self-executing declaration violates CERD's object and purpose).
333. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. position that
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recognize claims under non-self-executing treaties such as the
ICCPR and the Torture Convention, 4 it is far from clear that
the non-self-executing declaration precludes courts from ad-
dressing those treaties altogether.3 35 CERD has only been men-
tioned once in a published federal district court opinion in
which the court failed to raise its non-self-executing status.336
U.S. plaintiffs may invoke rights under non-self-executing
treaties such as CERD, however, by establishing a cause of action
under a domestic federal or state statute.33 7 A death row inmate,
for example, could invoke CERD in the penalty phase of a capi-
tal trial or in a habeas corpus proceeding by submitting evidence
demonstrating that the death penalty in that particular jurisdic-
tion has a racially discriminatory effect. The defendant would
not be relying on CERD to establish an independent cause of
action. This approach avoids the obstacle of the non-self-execut-
ing declaration.
Courts must recognize that non-self-executing treaties do
not automatically preclude treaty-based claims for recognition of
rights. Courts should reach the merits of CERD-based human
rights claims when CERD is raised as a defense to criminal
charges filed by a state or the federal government. 338 Constitu-
tional challenges to death sentences on the grounds of racial dis-
crimination should invoke CERD in the hopes that a court will
consider it a duly-ratified treaty of the United States.
B. U.S. Standards for Proving Discrimination in the Criminal Justice
Context Do Not Comply with CERD Standards
CERD mandates State Parties to address laws and practices
that have a discriminatory effect. 39 McClesky's holding that a
non-self-executing declaration would preclude private causes of action and that U.S. law
contained sufficient protections against discrimination).
334. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (mentioning cases that rejected
claims under ICCPR and Torture Convention based on non-self-executing declaration).
335. See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (noting that non-self-executing
declaration only precludes private causes of action).
336. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (noting that only federal district
court case to mention CERD did not address CERD's non-self-executing status).
337. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text (pointing out that U.S. courts
may apply non-self-executing treaties directly).
338. See supra note 280-83 and accompanying text (noting that courts should reach
merits of treaty-based human rights claims when petitioners use non-self-executing
treaty as defense or pursuant to other domestic cause of action).
339. See CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218.
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death row inmate must prove discriminatory purpose in order to
obtain relief under the Equal Protection Clause340 is inconsistent
with CERD provisions addressing the discriminatory effect of
race-neutral statutes. Although the United States endeavored to
eliminate all discrepancies between CERD and U.S. law through
its numerous reservations to CERD,3 4 1 it did not ensure that U.S.
standards for proving discrimination in the criminal justice sys-
tem complied with CERD standards.34 2 The U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that to raise an equal protection challenge
in the criminal justice context other than injury selection 343 re-
quires proof that the decisionmakers acted with a discriminatory
purpose.344
Article 2(1) (c) of CERD mandates State Parties to address
race-neutral laws and practices that have a discriminatory ef-
fect. 3 45 Article 5(a) of CERD also requires State Parties to elimi-
nate racial discrimination from the criminal justice system. 346
The Court in McClesky would not permit evidence of racially dis-
criminatory impact to affect the imposition of the death pen-
alty, 347 thus contravening Articles 2(1) (c) and 5(a) of CERD.
Proof of discrimination by demonstrating that the law or
practice in question has a racially discriminatory effect, however,
is not foreign to U.S. law. The Court and Congress have permit-
ted plaintiffs to bring claims of racial discrimination by showing
discriminatory effect in employment, voting, housing, and jury
340. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discus~ing U.S. Supreme
Court's finding in McClesky that McClesky would have to show discriminatory purpose
in order to get relief).
341. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. position that
reservations eliminate discrepancies between CERD and domestic law).
342. See supra notes 308-18 and accompanying text (discussing divergence between
U.S. and CERD standards for proving discrimination in criminal justice context).
343. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986) (finding that proof of sys-
tematic exclusion from jury pool raises inference of purposeful discrimination).
344. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text (noting that criminal defend-
ants must demonstrate purposeful discrimination in order to obtain relief under Equal
Protection Clause).
345. CERD, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(c), at 218.
346. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text (discussing Article 5 of CERD's
relevance in criminal justice context).
347. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing McClesky Court's re-
fusal to reverse death sentence based on evidence of death penalty's discriminatory
effect).
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selection. 34 In those contexts, the state has been able to rebut
the allegation of discrimination, by providing a legitimate, race-
neutral explanation for the disproportionate racial result. 49
Providing states with the opportunity to rebut claims of dis-
crimination is largely consistent with the CERD Committee's
General Recommendation 14, which states that it evaluates
whether a State Party's action has an "unjustifiable racial im-
pact. ''35 If a State Party could demonstrate that the action had a
justifiable racial impact, presumably the CERD Committee
would not consider the action a violation of CERD. In McClesky,
however, the Court cited the necessity of maintaining discretion
in the criminal justice system as a significant factor in its decision
to deny relief based on discriminatory effect.35' This holding
contravenes the provisions of CERD condemning race-neutral
statutes that have a discriminatory effect.
C. State Parties Should Use CERD's Enforcement Mechanisms to
Object to the U.S. Non-Self-Executing Declaration and to
Condemn Racial Disparity in Death Penalty Cases
CERD provides a comprehensive set of mechanisms for en-
suring that State Parties adhere to CERD standards.5 2 State Par-
ties and the CERD Committee should utilize these mechanisms
to address racial disparity in U.S. death penalty cases. The
CERD Committee should adopt a clear position prohibiting
broad qualifications to CERD such as the U.S. non-self-executing
declaration. Next, State Parties should object to the United
States' non-self-executing declaration as incompatible with the
object and purpose of CERD, pursuant to Article 20(2) of
CERD."' Finally, State Parties should use the inter-state com-
348. See supra notes 234-37, 303-05, and accompanying text (noting U.S. statutes
and cases permitting proof of discrimination by demonstrating discriminatory effect).
349. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (discussing prima facie framework
that allows state to rebut claim of discrimination).
350. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (noting that CERD Commit-
tee's General Recommendation 14 states that CERD prohibits only those actions having
'unjustifiable disparate impact").
351. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987)
352. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing CERD's mechanisms to ensure State Parties
fulfill obligations under CERD).
353. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. non-self-execut-
ing declaration may violate CERD's object and purpose).
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plaint mechanism 354 to condemn the McClesky decision and the
United States' failure to address racial disparity in death penalty
cases.
The Human Rights Committee, which administers the
ICCPR, issued an authoritative policy stating that reservations
that were over broad and sought to limit a State Party's ratifica-
tion to the extent of its domestic law were incompatible with the
ICCPR's object and purpose.3 55 The CERD Committee should
take a similarly strong position on the permissibility of sweeping
and far-reaching reservations. The CERD Committee should
find that the United States' non-self-executing declaration is in-
compatible with the object and purpose of CERD because it
seeks to protect the the United States from adopting the substan-
tive provisions of CERD.
Article 20(2) of CERD states that a reservation is deemed
incompatible with CERD's object and purpose if two-thirds of
the State Parties object to it.3 56 State Parties should object to the
United States' non-self-executing declaration and the CERD
Committee should declare that it is incompatible with CERD's
object and purpose. Such action by State Parties may encourage
the United States to withdraw the declaration.
Although State Parties have not invoked the state-to-state
provision of CERD,3 57 it could be a way to put international pres-
sure on the United States with regards to racial disparity in the
death penalty. State Parties should file state-to-state complaints
with the CERD Committee pursuant to Article 11 of CERD.
These complaints should argue that the United States' failure to
address racial disparity in the death penalty violates U.S. obliga-
tions under CERD.
CONCLUSION
Because the United States has refused to recognize that the
death penalty has a discriminatory effect on African-Americans,
enforcement of international norms is essential. Domestic law
has proven inadequate in providing relief to death row inmates
354. CERD, supra note 14, art. 11, at 226-28.
355. See supra notes 288-96 and accompanying text (discussing Human Rights
Committee's General Comment 24 condemning overly broad reservations and its possi-
ble applicability to CERD).
356. CERD, supra note 14, art. 20(2), at 236.
357. Id. art 11, at 226.
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who can prove racial disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty. CERD provides a new opportunity to apply interna-
tional standards for proving discrimination to U.S. death penalty
cases. While ratification of CERD demonstrates U.S. commit-
ment to complying with international standards for eradicating
racial discrimination, the non-self-executing declaration shows
that the United States is unwilling not only to allow its citizens to
invoke CERD, but also to allow CERD to affect domestic law.
The CERD Committee and State Parties must use CERD's
enforcement mechanisms to object to the United States' effort
to insulate itself from international standards. The CERD Com-
mittee should adopt strong criteria discouraging qualifications
to CERD that are incompatible with CERD's object and purpose.
State Parties should object to the United States' non-self-execut-
ing declaration and use the state-to-state complaint mechanism
to allege a violation of CERD by the United States due to its fail-
ure to address racial disparity in the death penalty.
The non-self-executing declaration only prohibits private
causes of action under CERD. 5 8 Under this analysis, a death
row inmate similarly situated to Warren McClesky could bring a
case invoking CERD Articles 2(1)(c) and 5(a) at the penalty
phase of his or her trial, at a habeas corpus proceeding, or pursu-
ant to Section 1983. Because this claim would not be a private
cause of action under CERD, U.S. courts should have no basis
for refusing to address its merits. Such a case could be a first
step toward remedying racial disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty..-
358. See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (noting non-self-executing dec-
laration does not preclude claims raising treaty as defense or under other domestic
relief provision).
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